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DIRECTOR ELECTIONS AND THE ROLE 
OF PROXY ADVISORS 
STEPHEN J. CHOI∗ 
JILL E. FISCH† 
MARCEL KAHAN‡ 
ABSTRACT 
Using a dataset of proxy recommendations and voting results for 
uncontested director elections from 2005 and 2006 at Standard & Poor’s 
1500 companies, we examine how advisors make their recommendations. 
Of the four firms we study—Institutional Shareholder Services (“ISS”), 
PROXY Governance, Inc. (“PG”), Glass, Lewis & Company (“GL”), and 
Egan-Jones Proxy (“EJ”)—ISS has the largest market share and is widely 
regarded as the most influential. We find that the four proxy advisory firms 
differ substantially from each other in their willingness to issue a withhold 
recommendation, in the factors that affect their recommendations, and in 
the relative weight of those factors. Specifically, ISS focuses on 
governance-related factors, PG on compensation-related factors, GL on 
audit/disclosure-related factors, and EJ on an eclectic mix of factors. To 
the extent these differences are understood, institutional investors can 
subscribe to those advisors whose recommendations best conform to the 
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investors’ assessments of value-maximizing corporate governance. But if 
these differences are not known, then proxy advisors may lack 
accountability for—and can pursue their own agenda in making—their 
voting recommendations, thereby impairing the effectiveness of the 
shareholder franchise. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Proxy advisory firms provide services to investors in connection with 
shareholder voting. Proxy advisory services had their start in the mid-
1980s, when Institutional Shareholder Services (“ISS”), now a business 
unit of RiskMetrics Group, was founded. More recently, several other 
firms—notably, PROXY Governance, Inc. (“PG”), Glass, Lewis & 
Company (“GL”), and Egan-Jones Proxy (“EJ”)—have started to offer 
proxy advice. These firms, which typically operate on a subscription basis, 
research proxy issues, issue voting recommendations, and assist 
institutional investors in formulating voting guidelines. 
Critics have expressed concerns about the influence that proxy 
advisors in general, and ISS in particular, can potentially exert over the 
shareholder voting process. Proxy advisors are depicted as powerful, yet 
unaccountable, institutions that can sway the outcome of corporate votes 
without any of their own money at stake. In addition to concerns about this 
extreme level of influence, commentators have identified potential conflicts 
of interest that might compromise the integrity of voting recommendations. 
These concerns are intensified by the limited transparency that proxy 
advisors provide about the processes by which their recommendations are 
determined. This lack of transparency has led the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce to describe ISS’s process for making proxy recommendations as 
a “black box.”1 
Because institutional investors now have the ability to choose among 
several different proxy advisors, the extent to which the advisors’ policy 
determinations are transparent becomes an important factor in ascertaining 
the efficiency of the market for proxy advisory services. The efficiency of 
this market has the potential to affect critically the outcomes of corporate 
elections. Numerous developments, including recent calls for increased 
shareholder activism, regulatory reforms that increase institutional investor 
obligations to vote responsibly, attempts to expand shareholder voting 
rights (via proxy access and “say on pay” initiatives), and the move from 
 
 1. Rachel McTague, Chamber Approaches RiskMetrics with Proposed Changes to Policy-
Setting, 40 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 569, 589 (2008). 
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plurality to majority voting in director elections, all increase the potential 
importance of the shareholder franchise and thereby increase the potential 
effect of the proxy advisory firms that influence the manner in which 
shareholders vote. If institutional investors understand the basis for voting 
recommendations of the various proxy advisors, they can subscribe to and 
follow the recommendations of those advisors that best match their 
assessment of which votes maximize corporate value. On the other hand, if 
institutional investors lack such understanding and choose to follow a 
proxy advisor based on other criteria, then proxy advisors are indeed, as 
charged by their critics, powerful, unaccountable, badly incentivized, and 
able to pursue their own agenda in issuing voting recommendations. 
In light of these concerns, understanding the role and influence of 
proxy advisors is critically important. Using a dataset of director elections 
at Standard & Poor’s (“S&P”) 1500 companies and proxy 
recommendations for 2005 and 2006, this Article examines the factors that 
affect the recommendations made by the four major proxy advisory 
firms—ISS, PG, GL, and EJ—in uncontested director elections. It is the 
first article to examine empirically the factors that affect these voting 
recommendations and the first article that compares the recommendations 
made by several proxy advisors. 
The Article proceeds as follows: Part II describes the development of 
the market for proxy advisory services, the main proxy advisory firms, and 
the institutional context in which those firms operate. Part III describes our 
basic regression analysis in which we analyze the relationship between 
withhold recommendations and a variety of director-specific, firm, and 
market factors that might be expected to influence the likelihood of a 
withhold recommendation. Part IV presents an interaction analysis in 
which we examine the relationship between several key factors. Part V 
examines whether directors who receive nominations for multiple boards 
receive different recommendations compared with directors who sit on only 
one board. Part VI discusses how group-based and spillover effects might 
influence whether advisory firms issue withhold recommendations. 
Part VII considers the implications of our findings. 
II.  THE EVOLUTION OF PROXY ADVISORS AND THEIR 
SERVICES 
ISS, the first proxy advisor, was founded in 1985 and began to provide 
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proxy advisory services to institutional investor clients in 1986.2 ISS 
provides these services on a subscription basis. A subscription entitles the 
client to ISS’s voting recommendations as well as a report detailing the 
underlying research and analysis upon which those recommendations are 
based.3 Additionally, ISS offers assistance in developing the client’s voting 
guidelines, providing issuer-specific research, and handling the mechanical 
process of voting the client’s shares.4 Clients may delegate to ISS the 
authority to vote their proxies, either in accordance with the client’s own 
voting guidelines or in accordance with ISS recommendations.5 ISS also 
evaluates issuer corporate governance and releases highly publicized 
corporate governance ratings in which issuers are scored based on their 
corporate governance structure and policies.6 
For many years, ISS faced a competitor—Proxy Monitor—that 
offered similar services, including voting recommendations.7 In 2001, 
however, the two companies effectively merged when Proxy Monitor 
acquired ISS.8 The merger left ISS as the sole proxy advisor and created a 
monopoly.9 Today, ISS remains the dominant proxy advisory firm. 
According to Robert Daines, Ian Gow, and David Larcker, “ISS claims 
over 1,700 institutional clients managing $26 trillion in assets, including 24 
of the top 25 mutual funds, 25 of the top 25 asset managers and 17 of the 
 
 2. RiskMetrics Group, Company History, http://www.riskmetrics.com/history (last visited Apr. 
20, 2009). 
 3. RISKMETRICS GROUP, PROXY RESEARCH SERVICES FOR INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS 
WORLDWIDE 1–3 (2009), available at http://www.riskmetrics.com/sites/default/files/GS1-Proxy% 
20Research%20Services.pdf. ISS recommendations are frequently reported in the media. See, e.g., John 
D. Stoll & Stephen Wisnefski, ISS Recommends Lear Holders Reject Icahn Bid, WALL ST. J., June 21, 
2007, at A12 (reporting ISS’s recommendation against Carl Icahn’s proposed takeover of Lear). 
 4. RISKMETRICS GROUP, supra note 3, at 1–3. 
 5. Id. at 2. Some companies have made notable use of these proxy voting services. See, e.g., 
Luisa Beltran, ISS Could Kill HP-Compaq, CNNMONEY, Mar. 4, 2002, http://money.cnn.com/2002/03/ 
04/deals/iss_hp/index.htm (describing how Barclays Global Investors delegated to ISS the authority to 
vote its nearly sixty million Hewlett-Packard shares in the vote on the merger with Compaq Computer 
Corporation and how one Barclays spokesman stated “[w]e provided ISS the authority to vote the 
shares” and “[w]e have no influence on how they are going to vote”). 
 6. Robert Daines, Ian Gow & David Larcker, Rating the Ratings: How Good Are Commercial 
Governance Ratings? 8–10 (Stanford Univ. Rock Ctr. for Corp. Governance Working Paper Series, 
Paper No. 1, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1152093. Firms are given a score based on 
their standing within their own industry and a score based on their standing within their index (for 
example, Microsoft standing within the S&P 500). Id. at 9. 
 7. See Investor Group Acquires Stake in Proxy Monitor, WALL ST. J., June 10, 1998, at A8. 
 8. Mark Thomsen, Proxy Monitor Buys ISS, SOCIALFUNDS, Aug. 13, 2001, http://www.social 
funds.com/news/article.cgi/648.html. 
 9. Martha McNeil Hamilton, Player in the Proxy Wars: HP-Compaq Merger Has Brought a 
Shareholder-Services Firm out of Obscurity, WASH. POST, Apr. 1, 2002, at E01 (describing ISS as 
“something close to a monopoly”). 
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top 25 public pension funds.”10 In 2006, ISS was acquired by RiskMetrics 
Group, a publicly traded company specializing in risk management 
services.11 
In addition to serving investors, ISS provides governance consulting 
to corporate issuers. For issuers, ISS offers “advisory services [to] help 
corporations understand and implement best practices in corporate 
governance, evaluate institutional voting behavior and design executive 
compensation plans, along with comprehensive risk management solutions 
for corporate treasurers.”12 As discussed below, the fact that ISS 
simultaneously issues advice to both corporations and institutional 
investors has garnered some criticism. 
Recent regulatory and market developments increased the demand for 
proxy advisory services.13 In 2003, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”) promulgated regulations that require mutual funds to 
develop voting policies and procedures designed to ensure that the funds’ 
voting power is exercised in the “best interest” of beneficiaries.14 In 
conjunction with these regulations, the SEC adopted rule 30b1-4 under the 
Investment Company Act of 1940, requiring mutual funds to disclose their 
complete voting records annually.15 The rule focused increased attention on 
mutual fund voting policies.16 Institutional investor activism also enhanced 
 
 10. Daines et al., supra note 6, at 2. 
 11. Joann S. Lublin, ISS Accepts Bid of $553 Million from RiskMetrics, WALL ST. J., Nov. 1, 
2006, at A10. 
 12. RiskMetrics Group, Corporations, http://www.riskmetrics.com/corporations (last visited Apr. 
20, 2009). 
 13. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REP. NO. GAO-07-765, CORPORATE 
SHAREHOLDER MEETINGS: ISSUES RELATING TO FIRMS THAT ADVISE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS ON 
PROXY VOTING 6–7 (2007) (describing various regulatory and market developments as leading to 
growth in the proxy advisory industry). See also PROXY Governance History, 
http://www.proxygovernance.com/content/pgi/content/history.shtml (last visited Apr. 20, 2009) 
(describing the development of proxy advisory services as “encouraged by a developing regulatory 
environment that would expand the market for proxy advisory and voting services”). 
 14. 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-6 (2003). 
 15. Id. § 270.30b1-4. 
 16. The Department of Labor had previously taken several steps to encourage mutual funds to 
vote shares in their portfolio companies responsibly. In 1988, the Department advised fund managers 
that “the decision[s] as to how proxies should be voted . . . are fiduciary acts of plan asset 
management.” Letter from Alan D. Lebowitz, Deputy Assistant Sec’y, Dep’t of Labor, to Helmuth 
Fandl, Chairman of the Ret. Bd., Avon Prods., Inc. (Feb. 23, 1988), in 15 Pens. Rep. (BNA) 371, 391 
(Feb. 29, 1988). The Department reinforced this position in 1990. See Letter from Alan D. Lebowitz, 
Deputy Assistant Sec’y for Program Operations, Dep’t of Labor, to Robert A. G. Monks, Institutional 
Shareholder Services, Inc. (Jan. 23, 1990), in 17 Pens. Rep. (BNA) 205, 244 (Jan. 29, 1990). It then 
formalized its policies in an interpretive bulletin in 1994. See Interpretive Bulletins Relating to the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 C.F.R. § 2509.94-2 (1994), amended by 29 
C.F.R. § 2509.08-2 (2008). Prior to the SEC’s rule change in 2004, however, these efforts did not 
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the focus on, and importance of, shareholder voting. 
As a result of these developments, several new proxy advisory firms 
entered the market.17 GL was founded in 2003.18 GL provides research and 
analysis on more than eighteen thousand public companies based in eighty 
countries around the world.19 In 2007, GL became a wholly owned 
subsidiary of the Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan Board.20 
EJ was established in 2002 as a division of Egan-Jones Rating 
Company, an independent company that provides credit ratings information 
for investors.21 EJ “provides research, recommendations and voting 
services for domestic and foreign proxy proposals offered in annual 
subscriptions priced according to the number of securities covered.”22 EJ 
provides this coverage for a flat fee of $12.50 per year per company.23 
PG is a wholly owned subsidiary of FOLIOfn, Inc., an innovative 
financial services company.24 PG began providing recommendations for 
the 2005 proxy season. Its first subscriber was the Business Roundtable, 
 
receive extensive attention. See CLIFTON D. PETTY, PENSION CONSULTANTS, INC., GATHERING 
STRENGTH: THE REINFORCEMENT OF FIDUCIARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR PROXY VOTING 1 (2004), 
available at http://pension-consultants.com/cimages/file_85.pdf (calling the 1994 Interpretive Bulletin 
“far ahead of its time”). 
 17. The analysis in this Article focuses on the four major proxy advisory firms—ISS, PG, GL, 
and EJ—which issue publicly reported voting recommendations on a regular basis. Several firms 
provide related services. For example, CtW Investment Group was organized in February 2006 and 
provides a limited number of recommendations to union pension funds. CtW’s primary efforts are 
devoted to developing initiatives to support the activism of member pension funds. See CtW Investment 
Group, Who We Are, http://www.ctwinvestmentgroup.com/index.php?id=1 (last visited Apr. 20, 2009). 
Also, Marco Consulting Group, which is included in the GAO Report as one of the major proxy 
advisory firms, see U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 13, at 8, provides investment 
consulting services to Taft-Hartley funds and a number of public employee benefit plans. These 
services include voting its clients’ proxies. See Marco Consulting Group, Company History, 
http://www.marcoconsulting.com/1.2.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2009). Marco does not, however, 
publicly issue voting recommendations. Id. 
 18. About Glass Lewis, http://www.glasslewis.com/company/index.php (last visited Apr. 20, 
2009). 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. See About Egan-Jones Proxy, http://www.ejproxy.com/about.aspx (last visited Apr. 20, 
2009); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 13, at 8. In 2007, EJ was recognized by the 
SEC as the fourth “nationally recognized statistical rating organization,” a status equivalent to that 
enjoyed by Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch. Order Granting Registration of Egan-Jones Rating Company as a 
Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization, Exchange Act Release No. 57031, 72 Fed. Reg. 
73,909 (Dec. 21, 2007). See also Aaron Lucchetti, Tiny Firm Gives Ratings Giants Another Worry: Mr. 
Egan’s Ranks Gain Favor as S&P, Fitch, Moody’s Draw Scrutiny, WALL ST. J., Feb. 9, 2008, at B1. 
 22. About Egan-Jones Proxy, http://www.ejproxy.com/about.aspx (last visited Apr. 20, 2009). 
 23. Id. 
 24. PROXY Governance History, https://wwwproxy.governance.com/content/pgi/content/ 
history.shtml (last visited Apr. 20, 2009). 
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which purchased a bulk subscription for its member companies.25 
The market for proxy advisory services continues to grow, fueled in 
part by the increase in institutional ownership of publicly traded equity 
securities. The overall percentage of institutional holdings rose from 37 
percent in 1992 to over 60 percent in 2005.26 Institutional investors are the 
primary, if not the exclusive, purchasers of proxy advisory services, both 
because their substantial holdings make the purchase of such services cost 
efficient and because they may lack the specialized staff or expertise to 
research voting issues directly.  
The SEC’s adoption of rule 30b1-4 increased the incentive for mutual 
funds in particular to purchase advisory services because reliance on the 
research and recommendations provided by a major proxy advisor is likely 
to help a mutual fund demonstrate that it has acted with appropriate 
diligence in exercising its voting power.27 Mutual funds comprise a 
growing percentage of the institutional investor market—the percentage of 
U.S. equities owned by mutual funds grew from 7 percent in 199028 to 32 
percent by the end of 2006.29 
At the same time, corporate governance changes have increased the 
significance of shareholder voting. The emergence of hedge fund activism 
has resulted in a greater number of election contests.30 Even in uncontested 
elections, shareholder voting has become more important because of the 
shift from plurality voting to majority voting.31 Historically, directors in 
 
 25. Id. 
 26. John Authers & Francesco Guerrera, Institutions Increase Equity Stakes, FIN. TIMES 
(London), Jan. 22, 2007, at 27. 
 27.  See 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-6(a) (2003) (requiring that mutual funds “[a]dopt and implement 
written policies and procedures that are reasonably designed to ensure that [they] vote client securities 
in the best interest of clients”). 
 28. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RES. SYS., FLOW OF FUNDS ACCOUNTS OF THE UNITED 
STATES, FLOWS AND OUTSTANDINGS, SECOND QUARTER 1996, at 88 tbl.L.213 (1996), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/19960912/z1.pdf. 
 29. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RES. SYS., FLOW OF FUNDS ACCOUNTS OF THE UNITED 
STATES, FLOWS AND OUTSTANDINGS, FOURTH QUARTER 2006, at 90 tbl.L.213 (2007), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/20070308/z1.pdf. Mutual funds include open-end and 
closed-end funds as well as exchange-traded funds. 
 30. Jill E. Fisch, The Transamerica Case, in THE ICONIC CASES IN CORPORATE LAW 46, 72 
(2008) (stating that “as a result” of increased hedge fund activism, “proxy contests are on the rise”); 
Alon Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance 16 (Eur. Corp. 
Governance Inst., Fin. Working Paper No. 139/2006, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
948907 (recognizing the launching of a proxy election as a hedge fund tactic). For a helpful description 
of hedge fund activism, see William W. Bratton, Hedge Funds and Governance Targets, 95 GEO. L.J. 
1375, 1401–09 (2007). 
 31. See Fisch, supra note 30, at 67–70 (describing the adoption and effect of majority voting 
policies). 
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most companies were elected by a plurality of the votes cast. Since most 
elections for directors are uncontested, with the number of nominees equal 
to the number of vacancies, it took just a single vote to get elected.32 As 
late as February 2006, 84 percent of S&P 500 companies employed 
plurality voting.33 By November 2007, that figure had declined to 34 
percent, with 66 percent employing some form of majority voting where 
nominees must receive more for votes than withhold votes.34 These 
majority voting requirements for the election of directors create a 
meaningful opportunity for shareholders to affect the composition of the 
board by casting a withhold vote without running a full-scale proxy 
solicitation.35 
Other developments that increase the effectiveness of shareholders’ 
votes compound the concerns of directors that are seeking reelection. A 
proposed New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) rule change would 
eliminate the right of brokers to vote stock held in their accounts in 
uncontested director elections for which they had not received voting 
instructions.36 Because discretionary broker votes typically are 
overwhelmingly cast for the board nominees, the proposed change to the 
NYSE rules would eliminate a large number of automatic for votes for the 
incumbent management’s slate of directors.37 Direct shareholder 
nomination of directors—a procedure that the SEC has repeatedly 
 
 32. See CLAUDIA H. ALLEN, NEAL, GERBER & EISENBERG LLP, STUDY OF MAJORITY VOTING IN 
DIRECTOR ELECTIONS, at ii (2007), available at http://www.ngelaw.com/files/upload/majoritystudy 
111207.pdf. 
 33. See id. at i. 
 34. See id. 
 35. Fisch, supra note 30, at 71. In her study of majority voting practices, Claudia H. Allen posits 
that the increased shareholder power that results from majority voting is augmented by developments 
such as the rise of proxy advisory firms, the fiduciary requirements placed on mutual funds, and the 
proposed New York Stock Exchange rule discussed below. ALLEN, supra note 32, at ii, vi. 
 36. In 2006, the NYSE submitted a proposed rule change to the SEC that would have eliminated 
such “discretionary voting” for director elections. See Press Release, N.Y. Stock Exch., NYSE Adopts 
Proxy Working Group Recommendation to Eliminate Broker Voting in 2008 (Oct. 24, 2006), available 
at http://www.nyse.com/press/1161166307645.html. Although the proposed rule was scheduled to 
become effective on January 1, 2008, to date, the SEC has not taken action on it. The NYSE recently 
refiled its proposed rule change, and recent changes in SEC leadership may increase the likelihood that 
the rule will be approved. Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change to Amend NYSE Rule 452 and 
Listed Company Manual Section 402.08 to Eliminate Broker Discretionary Voting, Exchange Act 
Release No. 34-59464, 74 Fed. Reg. 9864 (proposed Feb. 26, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
rules/sro/nyse/2009/34-59464.pdf. 
 37. See CtW Investment Group Urges SEC to Promptly Eliminate Broker Votes, REUTERS, Apr. 
17, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/pressRelease/idUS177265+17-Apr-2008+PRN20080417 
(explaining that discretionary voting has enabled directors to be reelected solely on the basis of broker 
votes and has been criticized as “legalized ballot stuffing” by which shareholders are 
“disenfranchised”). 
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considered but failed to implement38—would substantially increase the 
ability of shareholders to nominate competing director candidates. 
Outside the election of directors, other developments have 
strengthened the influence of shareholders on company decisions. 
Shareholder voting on issue proposals, such as bylaw amendments, has 
become more common. It was only in recent years that shareholder-
sponsored governance resolutions began to obtain majority approval. 
Research finds that issuer implementation of shareholder proposals that 
receive majority approval has almost doubled since 2002,39 and that outside 
directors who fail to implement such proposals face an increased likelihood 
of losing their board seats.40 Also, “say on pay” proposals have become one 
of the most recent and high-profile mechanisms for attempting to address 
excessive executive compensation.41 
With the growing importance of the shareholder franchise, the 
influence of proxy advisors has received increased attention. ISS, in 
particular, has been described as exercising “tremendous clout,”42 wielding 
“extraordinary” influence,43 getting “[w]hatever [it] wants,”44 and being 
able to sway up to 30 percent of the vote in any particular proxy contest.45 
Because of this influence, issuers and challengers devote substantial effort 
to meeting with proxy advisors and attempting to win their support.46 
Coupled with concern about influence is concern about the basis upon 
which proxy advisors make their recommendations. ISS, in particular, has 
been criticized for the actual or potential conflicts of interest generated by 
its corporate consulting. Prominent corporate governance expert Ira 
Millstein was quoted in the Wall Street Journal Online denouncing the 
 
 38. See Fisch, supra note 30, at 63–67 (describing the SEC’s consideration of proposals to allow 
shareholder nomination of directors). 
 39. See Yonca Ertimur, Fabrizio Ferri & Stephen R. Stubben, Board of Directors’ 
Responsiveness to Shareholders: Evidence from Shareholder Proposals 20 (Harvard Bus. Sch., 
Working Paper No. 08-048, 2008), available at http://www.hbs.edu/research/pdf/08-048.pdf. 
 40. See id. at 30–31. 
 41. See Fisch, supra note 30, at 71 (describing “say on pay” initiatives). 
 42. Dennis K. Berman & Joann S. Lublin, Advisor ISS Puts Itself on Sale, Could Fetch Up to 
$500 Million, WALL ST. J., Sept. 6, 2006, at C4. 
 43. Robert D. Hershey, Jr., A Little Industry with a Lot of Sway on Proxy Votes, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 18, 2006, § 3, at 6. 
 44. William J. Holstein, Is ISS Too Powerful? And Whose Interests Does It Serve?, BNET: THE 
CORNER OFFICE, Feb. 7, 2008, http://blogs.bnet.com/ceo/?p=1100&tag=content;col1. 
 45. Id. 
 46. See, e.g., Tom Johnson, HP, Compaq Merger Now in Hands of Shareholder Adviser, 
REUTERS, Dec. 11, 2001, http://www.rediff.com/money/2001/dec/11hp.htm (detailing efforts by both 
sides to obtain ISS support in the HP-Compaq merger vote and observing that “[m]erging companies 
typically place a great deal of weight” on meetings with ISS analysts). 
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conflicts inherent in ISS’s business model, stating that “[a]nyone who can’t 
see a conflict between consulting and standards-setting has a problem with 
their eyesight.”47 Another commentator described ISS’s business model as 
engendering conflicts of interest similar to those faced by accounting firms 
that provided auditing and consulting services, observing that “if similar 
conflicts arose at one of the shareholder meetings it monitors, ISS would or 
should criticize the issuer.”48 
PG has received criticism similar to that of ISS, primarily because its 
founding subscriber was the Business Roundtable, an association of 
corporate CEOs and a prominent pro-issuer advocate.49 PG addresses 
potential conflicts by maintaining a firewall between its proxy advising and 
corporate clients, but some commentators believe the firm’s relationship 
with issuers “set[s] the stage for potential conflicts of interest.”50 
Some institutional investors have responded to these concerns by 
choosing proxy advisors that do not provide consulting services. Sensitive 
to the controversy surrounding ISS’s business model, GL and EJ 
specifically advertise themselves as free of similar conflicts.51 This policy 
led the Ohio Public Employees Retirement System (“OPERS”) to replace 
ISS with GL in 2006.52 
More subtle issues remain. In particular, although all the major proxy 
advisors provide general guidelines that purport to explain their voting 
policies, they describe their processes as employing substantial issuer-
specific judgment, and the vast majority of criteria are applied on a case-
by-case basis. PG, for example, describes its recommendations as made on 
 
 47. Tiffany Kary, ISS Pressed on Conflict by Governance Expert Millstein, WALL ST. J., Nov. 
16, 2005, http://www.shareholderforum.com/PVN/Library/20051116_WSJ.htm. 
 48. Robert M. Krasne, Proxy-Voting Concern: ISS Wields Extraordinary Clout in 
Recommendations to Investors, Yet Also Provides Services to Corporations, PENSIONS & INVS., May 
31, 2004, at 12, available at http://www.pionline.com/article/20040531/PRINTSUB/405310706/1026/ 
TOC. 
 49. Arden Dale & Kaja Whitehouse, Legg Mason CEO’s Pay Questioned, WALL ST. J., July 18, 
2006, at C11; Bill Baue, Conflict of Interests Policies and Practices Vary Widely at Proxy Advisory 
Firms, SOCIALFUNDS, Apr. 19, 2006, http://www.socialfunds.com/news/article.cgi/1985.html. 
 50. Baue, supra note 49. 
 51. See GLASS, LEWIS & CO., LEADING INDEPENDENT ANALYSIS AND VOTING 
RECOMMENDATIONS ON GLOBAL PROXIES 2 (2008), available at http://www.glasslewis.com/ 
downloads/overviews/proxypaper.pdf (“Glass Lewis does not provide consulting services to 
corporations, CEOs or directors; as such, Glass Lewis’ research is without bias.”); Egan-Jones Proxy 
Services, http://www.ejproxy.com (last visited Apr. 20, 2009) (“[T]he integrity of our recommendations 
is not clouded with the complication of also selling corporate directors and managers consulting 
services pertaining to these same shareholder proposals.”). 
 52. See Kary, supra note 47 (quoting OPERS governance officer Cynthia Richson as stating that 
ISS had been dismissed “as a result of the ‘actual or perceived conflicts’”). 
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an “issue-by-company” basis,53 and it describes eleven factors that it 
considers “[i]n evaluating whether, in the context of a particular company, 
[to] recommend a ‘withhold’ vote from certain directors or the entire 
board.”54 Even with respect to practices about which the advisors provide 
substantial detail, there is no way to determine a specific recommendation 
from the general policies described. For example, in its 2006 policy updates 
concerning withhold recommendations for compensation committee 
members, ISS described itself as shifting from a case-by-case analysis to a 
“formal policy.”55 The formal policy merely consisted, however, of 
recommending withhold votes if the company had “poor compensation 
practices”—a standard determined by considering seven case-specific 
factors.56 
Thus, although some advisors identify bright-line criteria that 
determine whether they will issue a withhold recommendation for a 
director candidate, the majority of the policy guidance they publish consists 
of a variety of performance and governance factors that will be evaluated 
or weighed in an undisclosed manner and applied on a company-specific 
basis.57 It is impossible to tell from these lists the relative importance of 
each factor. Because the lists contain most of the criteria that scholars and 
governance experts have identified as important, they ultimately provide 
limited guidance on the advisors’ processes. It is the purpose of this Article 
to use empirical tests to identify the criteria that appear truly to drive the 
 
 53. PROXY Governance, Inc., Policy and Analysis Methodology 1 (unpublished manuscript, 
available at http://www.integrityfunds.com/PortalIntegrityFunds/DesktopModules/ViewDocument.aspx 
_?DocumentID=170) (refusing to take a “one-size-fits-all approach” that does not consider proxy issues 
in context); PROXY Governance Recommendations on an Issue-by-Company Basis, https:// 
www.proxygovernance.com/content/pgi/content/issue_by_issue.shtml (last visited Apr. 20, 2009) 
(same). 
 54. PROXY Governance, Inc., supra note 53, at 3–5. PROXY Governance does not explain how 
these factors will be weighted or combined. See id. 
 55. INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER SERVS., ISS U.S. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE POLICY 2006 
UPDATES 16 (2005), available at http://media.gibsondunn.com/fstore/documents/pubs/2006_US_ 
Policy_Update_1117051.pdf. 
 56. Id. ISS stated that poor compensation practices “include, but are not limited to, the 
following:” (1) “[e]gregious employment contracts including excessive severance provisions”; 
(2) “[e]xcessive perks that dominate compensation”; (3) “[h]uge bonus payouts without justifiable 
performance linkage”; (4) “[p]erformance metrics that are changed during the performance period”; 
(5) “[e]gregious SERP (Supplemental Executive Retirement Plans) payouts”; (6) “[n]ew CEO with 
overly generous new hire package”; (7) “[i]nternal pay disparity”; and (8) “[o]ther excessive 
compensation payouts or poor pay practices at the company.” Id. 
 57. Even where the criteria appear to be objective, the proxy advisors emphasize that they are 
examined and applied on a case-by-case basis. See, e.g., Egan-Jones Proxy Services, Proxy Voting 
Principles and Guidelines 3–5 (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors) (describing policies used 
in formulating recommendations for directors in uncontested elections). 
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advisors’ recommendations, a task to which this Article now turns. 
III.  ANALYSIS OF PROXY ADVISORY RECOMMENDATIONS 
A.  UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
We analyze empirically the recommendations of the four major proxy 
advisors—ISS, PG, GL, and EJ—in uncontested director elections. In these 
elections, there are no competing director candidates, so the advisor either 
recommends a vote for the director candidate or issues a withhold 
recommendation. During the time period of this study, most issuers utilized 
plurality voting, so a withhold recommendation, even if followed, would 
not directly result in the removal of a director. Nonetheless, a large number 
of withhold votes, even if technically symbolic, can have a powerful effect. 
For example, the highly publicized withhold campaign in the 2004 Walt 
Disney director election resulted in 45 percent of the votes being withheld 
from Disney’s CEO Michael Eisner.58 Although Eisner was elected to the 
board, the company announced six months later that he would retire in 
2006.59 
We focus on uncontested director elections for two reasons. First, the 
election of directors, who have the power to manage the corporation, is one 
of the most important governance rights of shareholders and is more 
significant than a vote on a precatory shareholder resolution.60 The board of 
directors has the power to manage the corporation, and a substantial 
number of regulatory and policy reforms in recent years have focused on 
increasing the independence, efficiency, and monitoring capacity of the 
corporate board.61 Moreover, several recent studies have shown that boards 
 
 58. Jay Sherman, Eisner Still in Charge, Disney Shareholders Re-Elect Board, Book Stirs Iger 
Doubts, TELEVISION WK., Feb. 14, 2005, at 3. 
 59. See id. (reporting Disney’s September 2004 announcement that Eisner intended to retire 
when his contract expired in September 2006). 
 60. Concededly, shareholder votes on mergers, spin-offs, and similar transactions are very 
important. By the same token, shareholder votes in contested elections are important, because election 
contests typically occur in situations involving a control or structural change. See generally Cindy R. 
Alexander et al., The Role of Advisory Services in Proxy Voting (Jan. 2008) (unpublished manuscript, 
available at http://www.law.yale.edu/images/CBL_Workshop/ACSS_proxy_advice_1_2008b__.pdf) 
(studying the role of proxy advisors in election contests). In transaction-driven votes, however, the 
shareholder vote is driven largely, if not exclusively, by the perceived economics of the proposed 
transaction—economics that are company specific. It is impossible to compare a recommendation for a 
merger at one company with one involving a different transaction at another company. 
 61. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950–2005: 
Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1477–1500 (2007) (describing 
the developments that led to increased board independence beginning in the 1970s). 
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respond to high withhold votes in director elections by taking actions that 
are beneficial to shareholders.62 Second, unlike other important voting 
decisions (such as a vote on a merger), director elections are common, 
which makes it easier to determine the factors that account for a 
recommendation. 
Our dataset examines director elections in 2005 and 2006. We focus 
only on director elections for U.S. companies listed in the S&P 1500 as of 
June 30 for the year prior to the relevant director election (June 30, 2004, 
and June 30, 2005, respectively).  
We first examined the factors that affect voting recommendations in a 
univariate analysis. Using a variety of sources, including academic articles, 
popular press, policy-governance initiatives, and regulatory proposals and 
reforms, we attempted to identify the director- and company-specific 
factors that investors are likely to consider important in formulating their 
votes. Based on this analysis, for each director in our sample of S&P 1500 
companies who received either a for or a withhold recommendation from at 
least one of the four proxy advisors, we collected the following data about 
the director’s characteristics:63 (1) whether the director was the CEO 
(“CEO”), an employee of the company other than the CEO (“Empl_Dir”), 
an outside director with certain links to the company (“OutDirLink”), or a 
new director (“New Director”); (2) whether the director was a member of 
the audit committee (“AuditMbr”), the compensation committee 
(“CompMbr”), or the nominating committee (“NomMbr”); and (3) the 
number of other major company boards on which the director sat 
(“ManyBds”), whether the director attended less than 75 percent of the 
director meetings (“Attendance”), whether the director held at least 20 
percent of the company’s stock (“BlockDir”), whether the director was an 
interlocking director (“Interlock”), whether the director was a nonexecutive 
chairman of the board (“Chairman Only”), and whether the director was 
seventy-five years old or older (“Age75”). 
 
 62. See, e.g., Paul E. Fischer et al., Investor Perceptions of Board Performance and Board 
Response to Those Perceptions: Evidence from Uncontested Director Elections 18–28 (Oct. 2008) 
(unpublished manuscript, available at http://ssrn.com/abtract=928843) (finding that boards who 
perform poorly in elections are more likely to dismiss CEOs, rein in compensation, and scrutinize 
acquisitions and divestitures). See generally Jie Cai, Jacqueline L. Garner & Ralph A. Walkling, 
Electing Directors, 64 J. FIN. (forthcoming Oct. 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1101924 
(finding evidence that boards with low shareholder approval tend to reduce management compensation, 
dismiss CEOs, and remove takeover defenses); Diane Del Guercio, Laura Seery & Tracie Woidtke, Do 
Boards Pay Attention When Institutional Investor Activists “Just Vote No”? (Jan. 2008) (unpublished 
manuscript, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=575242) (finding a correlation between “vote no” 
campaigns and subsequent improvements in operating performance). 
 63. See infra app. 
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TABLE 1.  Sample Summary 
Advisory  
Firm 
N Number of 
W/H Recs. 
Number of  
For Recs. 












All 16,038       
ISS 13,869 917 12,953 0.066    
PG 5437 202 5235 0.037 -8.7***   
GL 15,722 2956 12,766 0.188 32.4*** 37.4***  
EJ 14,147 1551 12,596 0.110 12.9*** 19.7*** -19.2*** 
 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
In addition, for each company and each year, we collected data from 
SEC filings, press releases, the Investor Responsibility Research Center 
(“IRRC”) Governance Database, the Georgeson Annual Corporate 
Governance Reviews, and the Center for Research in Security Prices 
(“CRSP”) on the following company-specific factors: (1) whether the first 
public report of a restatement to a company’s financial statement occurred 
within two years prior to the annual meeting (“Prior Restat”), whether the 
first public statement of an SEC investigation or enforcement action 
occurred within two years prior to the annual meeting (“Prior SEC”), and 
whether the company rejected an issue proposal that had received majority 
shareholder support in the previous year (“IP No”); (2) whether the 
company had a classified board (“ClassBd”), a poison pill (“PPill”), 
cumulative voting (“CumVote”), or golden parachutes (“GP”); (3) whether 
the company was in the top or bottom 5 percent of companies ranked based 
on abnormal holding period returns for the three-year period prior to the 
meeting date for the year of the recommendation, adjusted based on the 
CRSP value-weighted market index (“Top5AbRet,” “Bot5AbRet”); and 
(4) whether the CEO of the company was in the top 5 percent of total 
excess compensation (“Top5AbComp”). 
Table 1 provides some summary statistics about the coverage and 
withhold ratios for each of the four proxy advisors. We found that the 
advisors differed substantially in the percentage of withhold 
recommendations they issued. ISS issued withhold recommendations for 
6.6% of the directors in the sample, PG for 3.7%, GL for 18.8%, and EJ for 
11.0%. The difference in withhold percentages for each pair of advisors is 
statistically significant at the 1% level. 
To see how specific director and company attributes related to the 
likelihood of a withhold, we tabulated in tables 2.1–2.4 the voting 
recommendations for directors along several dimensions, and calculated for 
each proxy advisor whether the likelihood that a director with a certain 
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attribute (for example, a CEO) received a withhold recommendation from a 
certain advisor (for example, ISS) was significantly higher or lower than 
the average for that advisor. 
We divided the attributes into several categories and subcategories: 
(1) audit/disclosure-related attributes (audit committee member, prior 
restatement, prior SEC investigation); (2) compensation-related attributes 
(compensation committee member, top 5% abnormal compensation); 
(3) board-related attributes with the following subcategories: board 
effectiveness (attendance, many boards, age greater than 75), board 
composition (nominating committee member), board independence 
(employee director, outside linked director, block director, interlocking 
director, chairman only), and board responsiveness (shareholder proposal 
ignored); (4) takeover-related attributes (classified board, poison pill, 
cumulative voting, and golden parachutes); (5) performance-related 
attributes (bottom 5% abnormal return, top 5% abnormal return); and 
(6) uncategorized attributes (whether the director was a new director or the 
CEO). 
Since each advisor issues many more for than withhold 
recommendations, we posit that withhold recommendations are triggered 
by specific problems, either problems with a specific director or issuer-
level concerns. Several attributes in tables 2.1–2.4 reflect problems (or an 
increased likelihood of a problem) that we expect would be important to 
investors in deciding how to vote and should therefore affect the voting 
recommendations issued by proxy advisors. For example, commentators 
have identified low attendance and multiple board positions as factors 
correlated with reduced director effectiveness.64 Older directors may be 
less energetic or involved.65 Director performance may be impaired by a 
lack of independence or the presence of conflicts of interest (such directors 
may include employee directors other than the CEO,66 outside directors 
with linked affiliations with the company, directors with substantial block 
 
 64. See, e.g., John K. Wells, Multiple Directorships: The Fiduciary Duties and Conflicts of 
Interest That Arise When One Individual Serves More Than One Corporation, 33 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 
561, 581 (2000) (“More and more corporate watchdogs call for directors to limit the number of boards 
on which they serve.”); CPP Investment Board Releases Proxy Voting Guidelines, CANADIAN CORP. 
NEWSWIRE, Feb. 24, 2003 (identifying poor meeting attendance as an indicator of potential director 
ineffectiveness). 
 65. See, e.g., Useless at 70? Trends in Mandatory Director Retirement, ALLBUSINESS, Oct. 1, 
2001, http://www.allbusiness.com/business-planning-structures/business-structures/958172-1.html 
(reporting age limits and mandatory retirement policies among publicly traded companies). 
 66. Since it is generally accepted that CEOs should be on the board of their companies, their 
presence does not raise similar issues. 
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shareholdings, and directors that have interlocking board relationships with 
the company). 
Potential company-specific problems include poor governance and 
poor performance. Poor performance may be an important factor 
contributing to shareholder dissatisfaction with the existing directors. 
Shareholders may become dissatisfied with unresponsive directors, as 
evidenced by a failure to adopt a shareholder proposal that has received 
majority support.67 Shareholders may also view directors as unresponsive 
or entrenched if the company has a high level of antitakeover protection.68 
With respect to company problems, some directors may be viewed by 
shareholders as more responsible than others. Directors who sit on certain 
key committees may be held responsible for problems associated with that 
committee’s function.69 In particular, members of audit committees may be 
held more responsible for audit-related problems such as restatements and 
thus be more likely to receive a withhold recommendation. Compensation 
committee members may be held more accountable for excessive executive 
pay. New directors may be viewed as less responsible for company-level 
problems because such problems did not arise on their watch. 
It is difficult to predict how shareholders will view the responsibility 
of the CEO for issuer-specific problems, but we posit that CEOs will be 
viewed as having greater responsibility for corporate performance. On the 
other hand, given the more severe implications of not reelecting a CEO to 
the board, investors may view a withhold vote from a CEO as a more 
economically significant event and be wary of casting such votes. 
For each of the four proxy advisory firms, tables 2.1–2.4 report (as 
“% Total”) the frequency of each attribute as a percentage of each proxy 
advisor’s recommendations. For example, ISS made 1344 
recommendations for directors who are also CEOs and 12,917 
recommendations in total (where data exist on whether the director is a 
CEO or not) for a % ISS Total of 10.40%. Tables 2.1–2.4 also report the 
number of withhold recommendations for directors with the particular 
 
 67. See Ertimur et al., supra note 39, at 30 (finding outside directors who failed to adopt a 
shareholder proposal were more likely to be removed). 
 68. For an examination of the relationship between antitakeover and other entrenchment devices 
and equity prices, see Paul Gompers, Joy Ishii & Andrew Metrick, Corporate Governance and Equity 
Prices, 118 Q.J. ECON. 107 (2003). 
 69. Shareholders may, in particular, impose greater accountability on directors with specialized 
expertise. See Jill E. Fisch & Caroline M. Gentile, The Qualified Legal Compliance Committee: Using 
the Attorney Conduct Rules to Restructure the Board of Directors, 53 DUKE L.J. 517, 561–63 (2003) 
(assessing the effectiveness of using “expert” directors on specialized board committees). 
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 TABLE 2.1.  Summary Statistics on ISS Withhold Recommendations 



























All Directors   13,869 13,869 100.00 916 916 100.00  
CEO General ? 12,917 1344 10.40 839 74 8.82 -1.58 
New Director General - 13,869 2023 14.59 916 53 5.79 -8.80*** 
AuditMbr Audit + 12,829 5105 39.79 831 233 28.04 -11.75*** 
Prior Restat Audit + 13,869 1671 12.05 916 102 11.14 -0.91 
Prior SEC Audit + 13,869 1005 7.25 916 81 8.84 1.60* 
CompMbr Compensation + 12,829 4919 38.34 831 351 42.24 3.90** 
Top5AbComp Compensation + 13,267 657 4.95 868 65 7.49 2.54*** 
Attendance  Board Effect. + 12,798 81 0.63 831 36 4.33 3.70*** 
ManyBds Board Effect. + 12,473 1221 9.79 797 120 15.06 5.27*** 
Age75 Board Effect. + 13,869 1473 10.62 916 132 14.41 3.79*** 
NomMbr Board Comp. + 12,829 5042 39.30 831 349 42.00 2.70 
Empl_Dir Board Indep. + 12,829 804 6.27 831 86 10.35 4.08*** 
OutDirLink Board Indep. + 12,829 1358 10.59 831 268 32.25 21.66*** 
BlockDir Board Indep. + 12,812 107 0.84 831 28 3.37 2.53*** 
Interlock Board Indep. + 12,829 33 0.26 831 3 0.36 0.10 
Chairman 
 Only 
Board Indep. - 12,917 286 2.21 839 19 2.26 0.05 
IP No Board Resp. + 13,869 135 0.97 916 67 7.31 6.34*** 
ClassBd Takeover + 13,647 5074 37.18 908 364 40.09 2.91* 
PPill Takeover + 13,647 7014 51.40 908 436 48.02 -3.38** 
CumVote Takeover + 13,647 1526 11.18 908 116 12.78 1.59 
GP Takeover + 13,647 10,238 75.02 908 569 62.67 -12.35*** 
Bot5AbRet Performance + 13,847 526 3.80 916 47 5.13 1.33** 
Top5AbRet Performance - 13,847 744 5.37 916 59 6.44 1.07 
 
Note: “% ISS Total” is defined as the ratio of ISS recommendations for the specific attribute (“ISS Att. Recs.”) over the total 
number of ISS recommendations where data exist for the specific attribute (“ISS Tot. Recs.”). The definition of “% PG Total,” 
“% GL Total,” and “% EJ Total” is analogous. “% ISS W/H” is defined as the ratio of ISS withhold recommendations for the 
specific attribute (“ISS Att. W/H”) over the total number of ISS withhold recommendations where data exist for the specific 
attribute (“ISS Tot. W/H”). The definition of “% PG W/H,” “% GL W/H,” and “% EJ W/H” is analogous.  
 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 (from a x2 test of the null hypothesis that there is no difference between the proportion of ISS 
recommendations (for or W/H) for a specific attribute (for example, CEO) relative to all ISS recommendations (for or W/H) and 
the proportion of ISS withhold recommendations for a specific attribute relative to all ISS withhold recommendations) 
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TABLE 2.2.  Summary Statistics on PG Withhold Recommendations 



























All Directors   5437 5437 100.00 202 202 100.00  
CEO General ? 5078 528 10.40 182 5 2.75 -7.65*** 
New Director General - 5437 816 15.01 202 8 3.96 -11.05*** 
AuditMbr Audit + 5047 2014 39.90 182 74 40.66 0.75 
Prior Restat Audit + 5437 655 12.05 202 11 5.45 -6.60*** 
Prior SEC Audit + 5437 324 5.96 202 16 7.92 1.96 
CompMbr Compensation + 5047 1949 38.62 182 150 82.42 43.80*** 
Top5AbComp Compensation + 5236 289 5.52 190 45 23.68 18.16*** 
Attendance  Board Effect. + 5040 40 0.79 182 6 3.30 2.50*** 
ManyBds Board Effect. + 5042 470 9.32 180 23 12.78 3.46 
Age75 Board Effect. + 5437 558 10.26 202 35 17.33 7.06*** 
NomMbr Board Comp. + 5047 2003 39.69 182 87 47.80 8.12** 
Empl_Dir Board Indep. + 5047 305 6.04 182 2 1.10 -4.94*** 
OutDirLink Board Indep. + 5047 525 10.40 182 18 9.89 -0.51 
BlockDir Board Indep. + 5047 52 1.03 182 4 2.20 1.17 
Interlock Board Indep. + 5047 10 0.20 182 0 0.00 -0.20 
Chairman 
 Only 
Board Indep. - 5078 104 2.05 182 0 0.00 -2.05* 
IP No Board Resp. + 5437 65 1.20 202 6 2.97 1.77** 
ClassBd Takeover + 5330 1932 36.25 193 66 34.20 -2.05 
PPill Takeover + 5330 2929 54.95 193 108 55.96 1.01 
CumVote Takeover + 5330 634 11.89 193 27 13.99 2.09 
GP Takeover + 5330 4008 75.20 193 153 79.27 4.08 
Bot5AbRet Performance + 5432 262 4.82 200 1 0.50 -4.32*** 
Top5AbRet Performance - 5432 306 5.63 200 10 5.00 -0.63 
 
Note: See notes to table 2.1. 
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TABLE 2.3.  Summary Statistics on GL Withhold Recommendations 



























All Directors   15,722 15,722 100.00 2956 2956 100.00  
CEO General ? 14,526 1526 10.51 2673 58 2.17 -8.34*** 
New Director General - 15,722 2295 14.60 2956 172 5.82 -8.78*** 
AuditMbr Audit + 14,436 5765 39.93 2662 1223 45.94 6.01*** 
Prior Restat Audit + 15,722 1914 12.17 2956 499 16.88 4.71*** 
Prior SEC Audit + 15,722 1115 7.09 2956 254 8.59 1.50*** 
CompMbr Compensation + 14,436 5558 38.50 2662 1249 46.92 8.42*** 
Top5AbComp Compensation + 15,005 745 4.97 2782 169 6.00 1.04** 
Attendance Board Effect. + 14,396 98 0.68 2660 73 2.74 2.06*** 
ManyBds Board Effect. + 13,742 1302 9.47 2527 344 13.61 4.14*** 
Age75 Board Effect. + 15,722 1770 11.26 2956 424 14.34 3.09*** 
NomMbr Board Comp. + 14,436 5665 39.24 2662 1299 48.80 9.56*** 
Empl_Dir Board Indep. + 14,436 930 6.44 2662 180 6.76 0.32 
OutDirLink Board Indep. + 14,436 1523 10.55 2662 587 22.05 11.50*** 
BlockDir Board Indep. + 14,419 123 0.85 2656 29 1.09 0.24 
Interlock Board Indep. + 14,436 36 0.25 2662 27 1.01 0.76*** 
Chairman 
 Only 
Board Indep. - 14,526 329 2.26 2673 36 1.35 -0.92*** 
IP No Board Resp. + 15,722 146 0.93 2956 44 1.49 0.56*** 
ClassBd Takeover + 15,423 5577 36.16 2873 998 34.74 -1.42 
PPill Takeover + 15,423 7902 51.24 2873 1426 49.63 -1.60 
CumVote Takeover + 15,423 1683 10.91 2873 291 10.13 -0.78 
GP Takeover + 15,423 11,530 74.76 2873 2072 72.12 -2.64*** 
Bot5AbRet Performance + 15,717 794 5.05 2956 230 7.78 2.73*** 
Top5AbRet Performance - 15,717 794 5.05 2956 141 4.77 -0.28 
 
Note: See notes to table 2.1. 
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TABLE 2.4.  Summary Statistics on EJ Withhold Recommendations 



























All Directors   14,147 14,147 100.00 1551 1551 100.00  
CEO General ? 12,981 1340 10.32 1419 43 3.03 -7.29*** 
New Director General - 14,147 2032 14.36 1551 135 8.70 -5.66*** 
AuditMbr Audit + 12,892 5108 39.62 1405 551 39.22 --0.40 
Prior Restat Audit + 14,147 1614 11.41 1551 157 10.12 -1.29 
Prior SEC Audit + 14,147 1070 7.56 1551 139 8.96 1.40* 
CompMbr Compensation + 12,892 4909 38.08 1405 642 45.69 7.62*** 
Top5AbComp Compensation + 13,597 745 5.48 1502 116 7.72 2.24*** 
Attendance Board Effect. + 12,854 84 0.65 1403 47 3.35 2.70*** 
ManyBds Board Effect. + 12,439 1235 9.93 1362 537 39.43 29.50*** 
Age75 Board Effect. + 14,147 1683 11.90 1551 201 12.96 1.06 
NomMbr Board Comp. + 12,892 5047 39.15 1405 698 49.68 10.53*** 
Empl_Dir Board Indep. + 12,892 826 6.41 1405 47 3.35 -3.06*** 
OutDirLink Board Indep. + 12,892 1359 10.54 1405 377 26.83 16.29*** 
BlockDir Board Indep. + 12,875 98 0.76 1404 27 1.92 1.16*** 
Interlock Board Indep. + 12,892 33 0.26 1405 4 0.28 0.03 
Chairman 
 Only 
Board Indep. - 12,981 292 2.25 1419 30 2.11 -0.14 
IP No Board Resp. + 14,147 133 0.94 1551 15 0.97 0.03 
ClassBd Takeover + 13,916 4987 35.84 1526 493 32.31 -3.53*** 
PPill Takeover + 13,916 7098 51.01 1526 715 46.85 -4.15*** 
CumVote Takeover + 13,916 1514 10.88 1526 147 9.63 -1.25 
GP Takeover + 13,916 10,455 75.13 1526 1119 73.33 -1.80 
Bot5AbRet Performance + 14,147 566 4.00 1551 57 3.68 -0.33 
Top5AbRet Performance - 14,147 741 5.24 1551 62 4.00 -1.24** 
 
Note: See notes to table 2.1. 
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attribute (“Att. W/H”) and the extent to which that attribute is reflected in 
the total number of withhold recommendations (“% W/H”) (where data 
exist for the attribute in question). For example, ISS issued 74 withhold 
recommendations for CEO directors, which accounted for 8.82% of the 
total number of ISS withhold recommendations where data exist on 
whether the director is a CEO. 
Tables 2.1–2.4 then provide the difference between % W/H and 
% Total. This difference gives a measure of the relative effect of this 
attribute on the likelihood of a withhold recommendation. With respect to 
ISS, for example, the difference is equal to -1.58 percentage points for 
CEOs. This difference is not significant, indicating that CEOs are not less 
likely to receive an ISS withhold recommendation than average directors. 
We provide similar statistics for PG, GL, and EJ recommendations. 
As tables 2.1–2.4 show, both director and company attributes are 
associated with recommendations, largely in the predicted direction. The 
results suggest, however, that different proxy advisors are concerned with 
different categories. ISS seems to be most concerned about board-related 
factors generally. Of the ten board-related factors, seven are associated 
with a significantly increased probability of a withhold recommendation 
(all at the 1% level). Secondarily, ISS appears concerned about 
performance- and compensation-related factors (CompMbr and Bot5AbRet 
are both significant at the 5% level, and Top5AbComp is significant at the 
1% level). By contrast, neither takeover- nor audit/disclosure-related 
factors are consistently significant in the predicted direction. 
PG, although generally least likely to issue withhold 
recommendations, seems to be particularly concerned with compensation. 
Both compensation-related factors (CompMbr and Top5AbComp) are 
significant at the 1% level and numerically important. Several board-
related factors—Age75, Attendance, and IP No—are also significant. 
Employee directors (as well as CEOs) are less likely than average to 
receive a withhold recommendation (possibly due to the fact that they do 
not sit on compensation committees). Audit/disclosure-, performance-, and 
takeover-related factors are not associated with an increased likelihood of a 
PG withhold recommendation. 
GL issues the largest number of withhold recommendations. GL 
seems to pay particular attention to audit/disclosure-related factors (each of 
the three factors is significant at the 1% level) and performance-related 
factors (Bot5AbRet is significant in the predicted direction at the 1% level). 
In addition, most board-related factors (eight of ten) and both 
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compensation-related factors are significant. Takeover-related factors are 
not associated with an increased likelihood of a withhold recommendation. 
EJ appears to place weight on factors related to compensation (both 
factors are significant at the 1% level), board effectiveness (two of three are 
significant at the 1% level), and board composition (NomMbr is significant 
at the 1% level). Although being an outside linked director (OutDirLink) is 
associated with a statistically and economically significant increase in the 
likelihood of a withhold recommendation, being an employee director 
(Empl_Dir) is associated with a significant decrease in the likelihood of a 
withhold recommendation. EJ also seems relatively unconcerned about 
audit/disclosure-, performance-, and takeover-related factors. 
B.  BASE REGRESSIONS 
We next estimate a logit model for each of the proxy advisors with the 
recommendation by the advisor as a dependent variable (withhold = 1 and 
for vote = 0) and the director and company attributes in tables 2.1–2.4 as 
independent variables. In addition, we control for three factors: the year in 
which the recommendation was made (Year06), the standard deviation in 
the company’s stock return measured for the one-year period prior to the 
annual meeting date for the year in which the recommendation was made 
(Sdret), and the log of the market capitalization of the firm 
(ln(market capitalization)). The results of the logit models are reported in 
table 3. In table 3, we also report in brackets the marginal effect on the 
probability of a withhold recommendation for each factor, calculated in 
each case at the mean of the other factors. For example, for ISS, being a 
CEO increases the probability of a withhold recommendation by 3.5% if 
each of the other factors is at its mean level. Unless otherwise noted, all 
reported statistics are based on two-sided tests. 
Overall, the regression results are stronger than those of the univariate 
analysis. Of eighty-five variables for which we developed a one-sided 
hypothesis and obtained estimates, forty-six are significant in the predicted 
direction, but only two are significant in the opposite direction (compared 
with ten in tables 2.1–2.4). 
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TABLE 3.  Base Model 
Attribute Category VoteISS VotePG VoteGL VoteEJ 
CEO General 0.689*** -0.101 -1.087*** -0.307 
  (3.86) (-0.25) (-6.11) (-1.48) 
  [0.035] [-0.002] [-0.101] [-0.019] 
      
New Director General -0.746*** -1.150*** -1.065*** -0.170 
  (-4.18) (-3.44) (-10.99) (-1.42) 
  [-0.024] [-0.013] [-0.104] [-0.011] 
      
AuditMbr Audit -0.0599 0.179 0.446*** 0.196** 
  (-0.55) (0.96) (6.81) (2.27) 
  [-0.002] [0.003] [0.058] [0.013] 
      
Prior Restat Audit -0.292 -0.759 0.406*** -0.397*** 
  (-1.31) (-1.23) (3.99) (-2.72) 
  [-0.010] [-0.009] [0.057] [-0.023] 
      
Prior SEC Audit 0.230 0.787 0.329** 0.235 
  (0.79) (1.42) (2.22) (1.41) 
  [0.010] [0.018] [0.046] [0.017] 
      
CompMbr Compensation 0.533*** 2.169*** 0.384*** 0.413*** 
  (4.59) (5.13) (5.82) (4.76) 
  [0.022] [0.051] [0.050] [0.029] 
      
Top5AbComp Compensation 0.614* 2.220*** 0.320** 0.368** 
  (1.78) (5.22) (2.03) (2.28) 
  [0.031] [0.102] [0.044] [0.028] 
      
Attendance Board Effect. 2.903*** 1.690*** 2.679*** 2.975*** 
  (10.01) (2.99) (10.45) (11.04) 
  [0.394] [0.064] [0.567] [0.529] 
      
ManyBds Board Effect. 0.826*** 0.512* 0.530*** 2.424**( 
  (5.96) (1.75) (6.54) (24.82) 
  [0.045] [0.010] [0.077] [0.350] 
      
Age75 Board Effect. 0.136 0.966*** 0.243* -0.00849 
  (0.68) (2.66) (1.95) (-0.05) 
  [0.006] [0.024] [0.033] [-0.001] 
      
NomMbr Board Comp. 0.356*** -0.210 0.344*** 0.534*** 
  (3.33) (-1.13) (5.93) (6.84) 
  [0.015] [-0.003] [0.044] [0.038] 
      
Empl_Dir Board Indep. 1.585*** 0.146 1.036*** 0.417 
  (6.52) (0.15) (7.92) (1.50) 
  [0.122] [0.003] [0.174] [0.033] 
      
OutDirLink Board Indep. 1.976*** 0.245 1.422*** 1.884*** 
  (12.08) (0.47) (15.73) (15.51) 
  [0.167] [0.004] [0.252] [0.236] 
      
BlockDir Board Indep. 1.039*** 2.165** 0.593** 1.532*** 
  (2.97) (2.00) (1.97) (3.68) 
  [0.067] [0.107] [0.090] [0.191] 
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TABLE 3 (continued) 
Attribute Category VoteISS VotePG VoteGL VoteEJ 
Interlock Board Indep. -0.754 ... 1.787*** -1.076 
  (-1.23)  (3.78) (-1.25) 
  [-0.021]  [-0.360] [-0.047] 
      
Chairman Only Board Indep. -0.767** ... -1.112*** 0.0708 
  (-2.48)  (-4.65) (0.26) 
  [-0.022]  [-0.095] [0.005] 
      
IP No Board Resp. 3.028*** 1.432 0.851*** -0.553 
  (6.17) (1.57) (3.01) (-1.20) 
  [0.422] [0.047] [0.140] [-0.030] 
      
ClassBd Takeover 0.334** 0.0335 -0.0169 -0.0347 
  (2.18) (0.10) (-0.25) (-0.38) 
  [0.014] [0.001] [-0.002] [-0.002] 
      
PPill Takeover -0.0145 -0.0683 -0.0132 -0.0494 
  (-0.09) (-0.19) (-0.19) (-0.53) 
  [-0.001] [-0.001] [-0.002] [-0.003] 
      
CumVote Takeover 0.381* 0.269 -0.108 -0.0140 
  (1.83) (0.66) (-0.90) (-0.11) 
  [0.017] [0.005] [-0.013] [-0.001] 
      
GP Takeover -0.557*** 0.398 -0.115 -0.0585 
  (-3.24) (1.04) (-1.42) (-0.56) 
  [-0.025] [0.006] [-0.015] [-0.004] 
      
Top5AbRet Performance -0.0534 -1.359* -0.280 -0.193 
  (-0.18) (-1.92) (-1.52) (-1.11) 
  [-0.002] [-0.013] [-0.032] [-0.012] 
      
Bot5AbRet Performance 0.369 ... 0.393*** 0.133 
  (1.27)  (2.87) (0.60) 
  [0.017]  [0.056] [0.009] 
      
Sdret  28.56*** 20.83 12.97*** -1.915 
  (2.90) (1.01) (2.64) (-0.26) 
  [1.124] [0.328] [1.626]] [-0.128] 
      
ln(market cap.)  -0.0839 -0.0236 -0.0662** 0.0803** 
  (-1.40) (-0.21) (-2.31) (2.12) 
  [-0.003] [-0.000] [-0.008] [0.005] 
      
Year06  -0.126 0.162 0.145** -0.224*** 
  (-0.95) (0.72) (2.34) (-3.07) 
  [-0.005] [0.003] [0.018] [-0.015] 
      
Constant  -3.454*** -5.561*** -1.996*** -3.856*** 
  (-5.31) (-3.74) (-6.27) (-8.17) 
N  11,833 4509 12,973 11,809 
pseudo R2  0.152 0.198 0.106 0.206 
 
Note: t-statistics are in parentheses; marginal probabilities (calculated with all other variables set at their mean) are in 
brackets. Marginal probabilities are calculated using Stata’s mfx command. Where data are not available, ellipsis dots 
are inserted.  
 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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1.  ISS 
The results for ISS are largely consistent with those from the 
univariate analysis. Of the ten board-related factors, eight are significant in 
the predicted direction. Furthermore, as reported in table 3, several of the 
board-related factors have a material economic impact on the likelihood of 
a withhold recommendation. This is true for factors that affect relatively 
few directors,70 such as IP No (42.2 percentage point increase) or 
Attendance (39.4 percentage point increase); but notably it is also true for 
factors that affect an intermediate number of directors, such as Empl_Dir 
(6.3% of the sample of ISS recommendations, 12.2 percentage point 
increase in probability) or OutDirLink (10.6% of the ISS sample, 16.7 
percentage point increase). 
Among the compensation-related factors, membership on the 
compensation committee (CompMbr) is statistically significant, but has a 
small quantitative impact. Contrary to the univariate results and to the logit 
models for the other proxy advisors, CEOs are more likely to receive 
withhold recommendations from ISS. None of the audit/disclosure- or 
performance-related factors is significant. Of the takeover-related factors, 
golden parachutes (GP) are associated with a significant decrease in the 
likelihood of a withhold recommendation (at the 1% level), and classified 
boards (ClassBd) and cumulative voting (CumVote) are associated with a 
significant increase (at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively). New directors 
are less likely to receive withhold recommendations. 
2.  PG 
For PG, the regressions confirm the importance it places on 
compensation. Membership on the compensation committee (CompMbr) 
and top 5% abnormal compensation (Top5AbComp) are highly significant 
and yield high coefficient estimates. The marginal effects of CompMbr and 
Top5AbComp on the probability of a withhold recommendation are 
substantially higher than those for ISS—respectively, 5.1% versus 2.2% for 
compensation committee members (38.6% of the PG sample) and 10.2% 
versus 3.1% for top 5% abnormal compensation (5.5% of the PG sample). 
Of the eight board-related variables for which we could obtain estimates,71 
 
 70. We define a factor as affecting relatively few directors if it affects less than 1% of the 
sample. 
 71. Both Interlock = 1 and Chairman Only = 1 were perfectly correlated with a for 
recommendation by PG and, as a result, were dropped from the sample. 
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all three board effectiveness variables are significant at varying levels, and 
the variable for block director is significant at the 5% level. But the board-
related variables either affect only few directors (Attendance and BlockDir) 
or have only a small marginal effect on the probability of a withhold 
recommendation (ManyBds and Age75). Top 5% abnormal return 
(Top5AbRet) is associated with a marginal (both statistically and 
economically) reduction in the likelihood of a withhold recommendation; 
bottom 5% abnormal return (Bot5AbRet) was dropped from the regressions 
because it was perfectly correlated with a for recommendation. Neither 
CEO status nor any of the audit/disclosure- or takeover-related factors is 
significant. New directors are less likely to receive a withhold 
recommendation. 
3.  GL 
For GL, all audit/disclosure-related factors are significant, as are all 
ten board-related factors (all in the predicted direction). Membership on the 
compensation committee (CompMbr) and top 5% abnormal CEO 
compensation (Top5AbComp) are also significant, as is the indicator 
variable for bottom 5% abnormal returns (Bot5Ret). None of the takeover-
related factors is significant. In terms of marginal effect, board-, 
audit/disclosure-, performance-, and compensation-related factors are all 
highly significant. New directors are less likely to receive a withhold 
recommendation. 
4.  EJ  
 The regression results for EJ confirm its focus on compensation 
(CompMbr and Top5AbComp are significant). As for board-related 
attributes, the regression results indicate a focus on composition (NomMbr 
is significant) as well as effectiveness (two of three attributes are 
significant, as in the univariate test). EJ also appears to focus on board 
independence (OutDirLink and BlockDir are significantly positive), but not 
board responsiveness (IP No is insignificant). In terms of marginal effect, 
the most important factors—considering both their impact and the number 
of directors affected—are OutDirLink (10.5% of the sample of EJ 
recommendations, 23.6% increase in the likelihood of a withhold 
recommendation), ManyBds (9.9% of the EJ sample, 35.0% increase in 
likelihood), and NomMbr (39.2% of the EJ sample, 3.8% increase in 
likelihood). Of the audit/disclosure-related factors, being a member of the 
audit committee increases the likelihood of a withhold recommendation, 
but having had a restatement decreases that likelihood. None of the 
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TABLE 4.  Summary of Results 
Weight ISS PG GL EJ 
Focus Board Compensation Audit Eclectic 













Compensation  Board (effect.) 
Block Director 
 
 Compensation  
No Effect or  










Board  (resp.) 
Takeover 
 
performance- or takeover-related factors is significant, nor is being a CEO 
or new director. 
C. SUMMARY OF DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PROXY ADVISORS 
Table 4 summarizes and compares the factors that affect 
recommendations by the four proxy advisors. Overall, other than takeovers, 
each category is important for at least one proxy advisor, and two 
categories—compensation and board effectiveness—are at least secondary 
factors for each of the proxy advisors. Nevertheless, there are important 
differences among the advisors. ISS stands out in its attention to board-
related factors, paying less relative attention to compensation-related 
factors than PG and GL, and apparently no attention to audit/disclosure-
related factors. PG’s primary focus, by contrast, is on compensation, to 
which it attributes greater weight than it does to other factors and than do 
other proxy advisors. GL distinguishes itself from the other proxy advisors 
by the significant weight it places on audit/disclosure-related factors, which 
the other proxy advisors either ignore or (in the case of EJ) treat 
inconsistently. EJ is the most eclectic of the proxy advisors. It gives weight 
to selective board-related factors (but less consistently so than do ISS and 
GL), as well as to compensation-related factors (but less so than PG), and 
treats audit/disclosure-related factors inconsistently. 
IV.  REGRESSIONS WITH INTERACTION VARIABLES 
To refine our base regressions, we test whether certain factors are of 
special (or exclusive) importance for certain types of directors by adding 
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interaction variables. Specifically, we look at the interaction between 
several company-specific factors and the board members who are most 
likely to be viewed by investors as responsible for those factors. The 
existence of an interaction between a director’s role or responsibility for a 
problem and the presence of that problem would suggest that proxy 
advisors are paying attention to relative accountability within the board. 
We test four specific interactions: (1) the interaction between audit 
committee membership and the presence of an audit-related problem such 
as an SEC investigation or a restatement; (2) the interaction between 
compensation committee membership and the presence of abnormally high 
levels of executive compensation; (3) the interaction between corporate 
performance and a director’s status as CEO, employee director, or outside 
director; and (4) the interaction between service on a high number of 
boards and a director’s status as CEO, employee director, or outside 
director. 
Our hypothesis is that proxy advisors are more likely to issue withhold 
recommendations to target directors with specific responsibility for a 
problem. Thus, for the first two interactions, we expect the effect of a 
company problem to be focused on members of the relevant committee. 
We expect CEOs and employee directors to be more affected by corporate 
performance—receiving more withhold recommendations than the average 
director when the company underperforms and receiving fewer withhold 
recommendations when the company is doing well. As to membership on 
many boards, there are two opposing hypotheses. On one hand, if 
membership on other boards is a distraction, the effect is more likely to be 
important for CEOs and employee directors than for outside directors. On 
the other hand, if membership on other boards is related to one’s success as 
CEO (or officer), and our performance variable controls for CEO success 
only imperfectly, CEO or employee director membership on many other 
boards could serve as a proxy for success, partially offsetting any adverse 
effect otherwise associated with such membership. 
A.  AUDITING PROBLEMS AND AUDIT COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP 
To examine the relationship between restatements or SEC 
investigations and audit committee membership, we ran the base logit 
model for a withhold recommendation with the addition of the variables 
Prior Restat × AuditMbr and Prior SEC × AuditMbr. 
Table 5 reports our results for the four proxy advisory firms’ 
recommendations. In these regressions, Prior Restat estimates the average 
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effect of a restatement on non-audit-committee members; the sum of Prior 
Restat and Prior Restat × AuditMbr estimates the effect of a restatement on 
audit committee members; and the sum of AuditMbr, Prior Restat, and 
Prior Restat × AuditMbr estimates the effect of being both an audit 
committee member and experiencing a restatement. The effects for Prior 
SEC are analogous. 
In our base regressions, the audit/disclosure-related variables were 
consistently significant in the predicted direction only for GL. With the 
addition of interaction terms, the coefficient for restatements is no longer 
significant for GL, but the sum of Prior Restat and 
Prior Restat × AuditMbr is significantly different from zero at the 
1% level. This suggests that for GL, restatements affect the 
recommendations for audit committee members, but not for non-audit-
committee members (the coefficient for Prior Restat alone is not 
significantly different from zero). As to prior SEC investigations, the 
results indicate that they affect both audit committee members and 
nonmembers, and we cannot reject the null hypothesis that there is no 
differential in the effect. 
As to ISS and PG, audit/disclosure-related variables remain 
insignificant, as they were in the base regressions. For EJ, in the base 
regressions, a prior SEC investigation was associated with an increased 
likelihood of a withhold recommendation, but a restatement was associated 
with a reduced likelihood of a withhold recommendation. The addition of 
interaction terms indicates that the effect of an SEC investigation is 
confined to members of audit committees; the coefficient for Prior SEC is 
no longer significant, but the sum of Prior SEC and Prior SEC × AuditMbr 
is significant at the 10% level. As to restatements, the results indicate that 
the apparent reduction in the likelihood of a withhold recommendation is 
confined to non-audit-committee members; the coefficient for Prior Restat 
is significant and negative, but the coefficient for Prior Restat × AuditMbr 
is significant and positive, and the sum of Prior Restat and 
Prior Restat × AuditMbr is not significantly different from zero, indicating 
no significant reduction in the likelihood of a withhold recommendation 
due to a restatement for audit committee members. 
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TABLE 5.  Interaction Between Prior Restat and Prior SEC and AuditMbr; 
Interaction Between Top5AbComp and CompMbr 
Attribute VoteISS VotePG VoteGL VoteEJ 
AuditMbr -0.104 0.228 0.377*** 0.129 
 (-0.88) (1.13) (5.50) (1.42) 
     
Prior Restat -0.381 -1.015 0.147 -0.640*** 
 (-1.48) (-1.44) (1.03) (-3.61) 
     
Prior Restat × AuditMbr 0.277 0.531 0.554*** 0.570* 
 (0.90) (0.93) (2.88) (2.23) 
     
Prior SEC 0.164 1.069 0.361** 0.159 
 (0.48) (1.51) (2.04) (0.68) 
     
Prior SEC × AuditMbr 0.233 -1.064 -0.0673 0.213 
 (0.60) (-1.22) (-0.33) (0.70) 
     
CompMbr 0.502*** 1.675*** 0.344*** 0.432*** 
 (4.30) (4.33) (5.24) (4.85) 
     
Top5AbComp 0.411 -0.567 -0.0201 0.436* 
 (0.89) (-0.51) (-0.12) (1.93) 











     
Year06 -0.126 0.165 0.148** -0.223*** 
 (-0.95) (0.71) (2.38) (-3.06) 
     
Constant -3.426*** -5.164*** -1.948*** -3.852*** 
 (-5.26) (-3.43) (-6.06) (-8.16) 
N 11,833 4509 12,973 11,809 
pseudo R2 0.153 0.216 0.108 0.207 
     
Select F-Tests     
Prior Restat +  
 Prior Restat ×    
 AuditMbr 
0.7086 0.4721 0.0000 0.7404 
Prior Restat + AuditMbr 
 + Prior Restat × 
 AuditMbr 
0.4566 0.6995 0.0000 0.7867 
Prior SEC +  
 Prior SEC × AuditMbr 
0.2434 0.9931 0.1034 0.0635 
Prior SEC + AuditMbr + 
 Prior SEC × AuditMbr 
0.3887 0.7006 0.0003 0.0153 
Top5AbComp+   
 Top5AbComp ×     
 CompMbr 
0.0275 0.0000 0.0033 0.1721 
Top5AbComp +     
 CompMbr + 
 Top5AbComp ×     
 CompMbr 
0.0007 0.0000 0.0000 0.0007 
 
Note: t-statistics are in parentheses. F-tests are of the null hypothesis that the sum of the coefficients equals 0. All 
models use the base models in table 3 with the addition of interaction terms. We report only the coefficients for the 
additional interaction terms and associated variables. 
 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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B.  HIGH COMPENSATION AND COMPENSATION COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP 
To examine the relationship between top 5% abnormal compensation 
(Top5AbComp) and compensation committee membership (CompMbr), we 
also estimated the base logit model for a withhold recommendation with 
the addition of the interaction variable Top5AbComp × CompMbr. Table 5 
reports our results for the four proxy advisory firms’ recommendations. 
Top5AbComp estimates the average effect of Top5AbComp on non-
compensation-committee members, and the sum of Top5AbComp and 
Top5AbComp × CompMbr estimates the effect on compensation committee 
members (in each case relative to having the same position but not paying 
top compensation). 
In the base logit models reported in table 3, paying abnormally high 
CEO compensation was associated with an increased likelihood of a 
withhold recommendation by ISS, PG, GL, and EJ. For GL and PG, the 
results of the logit models with interaction terms reported in table 5 
indicate that paying abnormally high CEO compensation raises the 
likelihood of a withhold recommendation only for members of the 
compensation committee. The coefficient for Top5AbComp alone 
(measuring the effect of high CEO compensation for nonmembers) is 
insignificant; but the sum of Top5AbComp and Top5AbComp × CompMbr 
is positive and significant at the 1% level for each advisor. In the logit 
models with interaction terms, we obtain similar results for ISS, even 
though paying abnormally high compensation was insignificant for ISS in 
the base models. For EJ, by contrast, the regressions with interaction terms 
indicate that paying abnormally high CEO compensation is associated with 
a significant increase in the likelihood of a withhold recommendation for 
non-compensation-committee members (as measured by Top5AbComp). 
While Top5AbComp + Top5AbComp × CompMbr is positive, the sum is 
not significantly different from zero, and we thus cannot reject the 
hypothesis that paying abnormally high compensation has no effect on 
recommendations for compensation committee members. 
C.  PERFORMANCE AND INSIDE DIRECTORS 
To examine the effect of performance on withhold recommendations 
for inside directors, we estimated the base logit models with the addition of 
the following variables: Top5AbRet × CEO, Top5AbRet × Empl_Dir, 
Bot5AbRet × CEO, and Bot5AbRet × Empl_Dir. Table 6 reports our 
results. 
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TABLE 6.  Interaction Between Top5AbRet and CEO and Empl_Dir 
Attribute VoteISS VotePG VoteGL VoteEJ 
CEO 0.630*** -0.0755 -1.064*** -0.330 
 (3.42) (-0.18) (-5.69) (-1.56) 
     
Empl_Dir 1.487*** 0.162 1.069*** 0.345 
 (6.05) (0.17) (8.02) (1.28) 
     
Top5AbRet -0.240 -1.319* -0.308 -0.284 
 (-0.84) (-1.85) (-1.62) (-1.61) 
     
Top5AbRet × CEO 0.495 ... 0.752 0.626 
 (1.36)  (1.37) (0.92) 
     
Top5AbRet × Empl_Dir 0.905+ ... -0.0316 0.890 
 (1.67)  (-0.08) (1.21) 
     
Bot5AbRet 0.264 ... 0.467*** 0.126 
 (0.88)  (3.23) (0.59) 
     
Bot5AbRet × CEO 0.412 ... -1.502 -0.341 
 (0.95)  (-1.48) (-0.31) 
     
Bot5AbRet × Empl_Dir 0.614 ... -0.904* 0.411 
 (0.88)  (-1.66) (0.37) 
     
Year06 -0.125 0.162 0.144** -0.224*** 
 (-0.94) (0.72) (2.32) (-3.07) 
     
Constant -3.430*** -5.562*** -2.002*** -3.853*** 
 (-5.28) (-3.75) (-6.27) (-8.22) 
N 11,833 4468 12,973 11,809 
pseudo R2 0.153 0.197 0.107 0.207 
     
Select F-Tests     
Top5AbRet +  
 Top5AbRet × CEO 
0.5985 ... 0.4176 0.6028 
Top5AbRet + CEO + 
 Top5AbRet × CEO 
0.0764 ... 0.2401 0.9853 
Top5AbRet +  
 Top5AbRet × Empl_Dir 
0.2384 ... 0.3803 0.3865 
Top5AbRet + Empl_Dir + 
 Top5AbRet × Empl_Dir 
0.0003 ... 0.0611 0.1939 
Bot5AbRet +  
 Bot5AbRet × CEO 
0.1492 ... 0.3055 0.8425 
Bot5AbRet + CEO + 
 Bot5AbRet × CEO 
0.0064 ... 0.0363 0.6189 
Bot5AbRet +  
 Bot5AbRet × Empl_Dir 
0.1992 ... 0.4068 0.6282 
Bot5AbRet + Empl_Dir + 
 Bot5AbRet × Empl_Dir 
0.0009 ... 0.2368 0.4395 
 
Note: t-statistics are in parentheses. F-tests are of the null hypothesis that the sum of the coefficients equals 0. All 
models use the base models in table 3 with the addition of interaction terms. We report only the coefficients for the 
additional interaction terms and associated variables. Where data are unavailable, ellipsis dots are inserted. 
 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01  
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In these regressions, Top5AbRet estimates the effect of top returns on 
directors who are neither the CEO nor employees of the company, and the 
sum of Top5AbRet and Top5AbRet × CEO estimates the effect of top 
returns on the CEO. Effects for employee directors and bottom returns are 
analogous. 
For ISS, as in the base logit models, the logit models with interactive 
terms produce no evidence that top or bottom returns affect ISS 
recommendations. 
For GL, the logit models with interaction terms indicate that bottom 
returns affect the likelihood of a withhold recommendation only for outside 
directors (as measured by the Bot5AbRet variable). Contrary to our 
hypothesis, there is no evidence that bottom returns affect 
recommendations for inside directors (as measured by the sum of 
Bot5AbRet and Bot5AbRet × CEO). The logit models also indicate that top 
returns do not affect the likelihood of a withhold recommendation for any 
director (as measured by Top5AbRet and the sums of Top5AbRet and 
Top5AbRet × CEO and of Top5AbRet and Top5AbRet × Empl_Dir). 
For EJ, neither the base regressions nor the regressions with 
interactive terms generate evidence that our performance measures affect 
recommendations. For PG, we were unable to estimate the logit model with 
interaction terms because Top5AbRet × CEO = 1, Top5AbRet × Empl_Dir 
= 1, Bot5AbRet × CEO = 1, and Bot5AbRet × Empl_Dir = 1 were each 
perfectly correlated with a for recommendation by PG and, as a result, were 
dropped from the model.  
D.  MULTIPLE BOARD SEATS 
To examine the effect of membership on many boards, we estimated 
the base logit models with the addition of the interaction variables 
ManyBds × CEO and ManyBds × Empl_Dir. Table 7 reports our results. 
In these models, ManyBds estimates the effect of sitting on multiple 
boards on directors who are neither the CEO nor an employee of the 
company, and the sum of ManyBds and ManyBds × CEO estimates the 
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TABLE 7.  Interaction Between ManyBds and CEO and Empl_Dir 
Attribute VoteISS VotePG VoteGL VoteEJ 
CEO 0.786*** -0.0300 -1.111*** -0.295 
 (4.38) (-0.07) (-6.12) (-1.28) 
     
Empl_Dir 1.615*** 0.152 1.040*** 0.480* 
 (6.63) (0.15) (7.93) (1.72) 
     
ManyBds 0.903*** 0.531* 0.527*** 2.440*** 
 (6.44) (1.82) (6.42) (24.45) 
     
ManyBds × CEO ... ... 0.353 -0.0345 
   (0.52) (-0.07) 
     
ManyBds × Empl_Dir. ... ... -0.327 -1.276 
   (-0.36) (-1.60) 
     
Year06 -0.130 0.163 0.146** -0.225*** 
 (-0.98) (0.72) (2.34) (-3.08) 
     
Constant -3.454*** -5.560*** -1.997*** -3.860*** 
 (-5.32) (-3.74) (-6.26) (-8.16) 
N 11,777 4491 12,973 11,809 
pseudo R2 0.153 0.198 0.106 0.207 
     
Select F-Tests     
ManyBds +  
 ManyBds × CEO 
... ... 0.1891 0.0000 
ManyBds + CEO + 
 ManyBds × CEO 
... ... 0.7252 0.0000 
ManyBds +  
 ManyBds × Empl_Dir 
... ... 0.8261 0.1392 
ManyBds + Empl_Dir + 
 ManyBds × Empl_Dir 
... ... 0.1741 0.0384 
 
Note: t-statistics are in parentheses. F-tests are of the null hypothesis that the sum of the coefficients equals 0. All 
models use the base models in table 3 with the addition of interaction terms. We report only the coefficients for the 
additional interaction terms and associated variables. Where data are unavailable, ellipsis dots are inserted. 
 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
In the base logit models reported in table 3, sitting on multiple boards 
increased the likelihood of a withhold recommendation for GL and EJ. The 
logit models with interaction terms reported in table 7 suggest that, in the 
case of GL, this effect may be confined to outside directors. For outside 
directors, sitting on multiple boards is associated with a higher likelihood 
of a withhold recommendation for non-CEOs (at the 1% level), as 
measured by the coefficient for ManyBds alone. By contrast, neither 
ManyBds + ManyBds × Empl_Dir (for GL and EJ) nor ManyBds 
+ ManyBds × CEO (for GL) is significantly different from zero. 
For EJ, both ManyBds alone and Many Bds + ManyBds × CEO are 
highly significant, and the sum of ManyBds and ManyBds × Empl_Dir is 
borderline insignificant. For ISS and PG, we were unable to estimate the 
logit model with interaction terms because, for both, ManyBds × Empl_Dir 
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= 1 and ManyBds × CEO = 1 were perfectly correlated with a for 
recommendation and, as a result, were dropped from the model. 
E.  SUMMARY 
Overall, the set of regressions with interaction variables indicates that, 
at least in the case of some advisors, members of the relevant committee 
are held particularly responsible for problems within that committee’s 
jurisdiction. Thus, we find that for ISS, PG, and GL, the adverse effects of 
high compensation are focused on compensation committee members; for 
GL, the adverse effects of a restatement are felt by audit committee 
members; for EJ, the adverse effects of an SEC investigation are tied to 
audit committee members; for ISS, the adverse effects of bottom returns 
are confined to CEOs; and for GL, the adverse effects of sitting on multiple 
boards relate only to outside directors. 
V.  MULTIPLE NOMINATIONS 
A large number of individuals in our sample were nominated for 
election to the boards of several companies in the same year and received 
multiple recommendations by the same proxy advisor, as reported in 
table 8.1. For these sets of nominees, we investigated the relationship 
between the multiple recommendations for the same person made by each 
advisor. 
As a starting point, we examined whether the overall withhold 
percentage for directors who received multiple recommendations from a 
proxy advisor differs from the withhold percentage for directors who 
received only a single recommendation from the same proxy advisor. Note 
that the number of recommendations from a proxy advisor is correlated 
with, but not identical to, the number of board seats because (1) the director 
may sit on a staggered board of a different company that does not have an 
election in that year or (2) even if the other company has an election in the 
same year, the proxy advisor may not issue a recommendation because its 
coverage is less than 100 percent. Table 8.2 provides the withhold 
percentages for each advisor depending on whether the individual received 
one, two, or three recommendations from that advisor.72 Except for EJ, the 
differences in withhold percentages are statistically (and, for the most part, 
economically) insignificant. 
 
 72. ISS, GL, and EJ had some individuals who received more than three recommendations, but 
those numbers of individuals were too small for statistical analysis. 
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TABLE 8.2.  Withhold Percentages for Nominees 
N ISS PG GL EJ
1 0.067565 0.035389 0.187367 0.079342    
2 0.056641 0.048214 0.176570 0.144131a 
3 0.070175 0.088889 0.217662 0.305785b 
 
Note: N is the number of boards for which an individual received a recommendation by an advisor. For EJ, a indicates 
the t-test of the difference in withhold percentage for N = 2 versus N = 1 is significant at the 1% level; b indicates the t-
test of the difference in withhold percentage for N = 3 versus N = 1 is significant at the 1% level. 
 
TABLE 8.3.  Conditional Probabilities 
N Calculation ISS PG GL EJ 
2 P(W/H, F) 4.8 4.3 16.6 8.9 
2 P(W/H, W/H) 19.3 14.8 22.6 47.0 
3 P(W/H-W/H, F) 1.4  3.7 4.8 
3 P(W/H-W/H, W/H) 12.5  24.0 64.9 
3 P(W/H-*, F) 8.9  31.3 16.7 
3 P(W/H-*, W/H) 50.0  50.3 86.5 
3 P(W/H-F, F) 7.5  27.6 11.9 
3 P(W/H-F, W/H) 37.5  26.7 21.6 
 
Note: N is the number of boards for which an individual received a recommendation by an advisor. “P(W/H, F)” and 
“P(W/H, W/H)” are, respectively, the conditional probabilities of a withhold recommendation conditional (for 
nominees with 2 recommendations) on the other recommendation being for or withhold. “P(W/H-W/H, F)” and 
“P(W/H-W/H, W/H)” are, respectively, the conditional probabilities of two withhold recommendations conditional 
(for nominees with 3 recommendations) on the other recommendation being for or withhold. “P(W/H-*, F)” and 
“P(W/H-*, W/H)” are, respectively, the conditional probabilities of at least one withhold recommendation conditional 
(for nominees with 3 recommendations) on the other recommendation being for or withhold. “P(W/H-F, F)” and 
“P(W/H-F, W/H)” are, respectively, the conditional probabilities of exactly one withhold recommendation conditional 
(for nominees with 3 recommendations) on the other recommendation being for or withhold. 
We next turn to whether recommendations for the same individual 
from the same advisor are correlated. Our null hypothesis is that 
recommendations are not correlated. To test this hypothesis, we calculated 
the following: for individuals who received two recommendations (i, j), we 
calculated the conditional probabilities for each advisor that i = withhold, 
conditional on j = for and on j = withhold; for individuals who received 
three recommendations (i, j, k), we calculated the conditional probabilities 
for each advisor (other than PG, which had too few observations) that both 
i = withhold and j = withhold, or that either i = withhold or j = withhold, 
conditional on k = for and on k = withhold. The results are reported in 
table 8.3.  
For each of the advisors, we can reject the null hypothesis that the 
recommendations are independent. Note, however, that the degree of 
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correlation in the recommendations differs substantially among advisors. 
Generally, the correlation is strongest for EJ and weakest for GL, with ISS 
and PG occupying an intermediate position. For EJ, for example, the 
conditional probability of a withhold recommendation for a double-
nomination individual increases from 9% to 47% depending on whether the 
other recommendation is for or withhold. For GL, that increase is much 
more modest, from 17% to 23%; for ISS and PG, it is, respectively, from 
5% to 19% and from 4% to 15%. 
Three reasons may account for the correlation among 
recommendations. First, there may be a spillover effect in that the proxy 
advisor will take into account the conduct that led to a withhold 
recommendation for board 1 in issuing its recommendation for board 2 (the 
“spillover hypothesis”). Second, the same factor (for example, a criminal 
conviction), which is not tied to service on a particular board, may account 
for multiple withhold recommendations (the “single factor hypothesis”). 
Third, certain individuals may be more likely to engage in conduct (for 
example, because they are lazy) that results in a withhold recommendation 
(the “higher proclivity hypothesis”). For these individuals, the ex ante 
likelihood of a withhold recommendation is higher than for others. 
Although, given this higher ex ante likelihood, each recommendation is 
independent, the recommendations are correlated when they are pooled 
with individuals who have a lower ex ante likelihood of a withhold 
recommendation. 
To differentiate between these hypotheses, the following test was 
performed. The spillover hypothesis suggests that the order in which the 
conduct of directors is assessed matters. Conduct on board 1 that results in 
a withhold recommendation should result in a withhold recommendation 
for board 2 only if that conduct has been evaluated by the time the 
recommendation for board 2 is released. Proxy advisors, of course, do not 
release all recommendations at the same time but generally release each 
recommendation shortly before the corresponding annual meeting. The 
dates of the annual meetings should thus provide a rough benchmark of the 
timing of the proxy advisor’s evaluation. The spillover hypothesis would 
thus suggest that a withhold recommendation for board 1 should be 
correlated with a withhold recommendation for board 2 only if the annual 
meeting for board 1 preceded the meeting for board 2. The data, however, 
provide no support for the spillover hypothesis for any of the proxy 
advisors. In each case, the order of the meetings had no effect on 
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correlations.73 
To differentiate between the single factor and the higher proclivity 
hypothesis, we focused on individuals who received three 
recommendations by a single advisor. The single factor hypothesis would 
predict that, if one of these recommendations is withhold, the likelihood of 
both of the other recommendations being withhold should increase 
substantially, but there should be no increase in the likelihood that one of 
the other two (but not both) is withhold. The higher proclivity hypothesis 
would predict a lesser increase in the former likelihood but an increase in 
the latter. 
The data indicate strong support for the single factor hypothesis with 
respect to GL. If one recommendation is withhold rather than for, the 
likelihood that both other recommendations are also withhold increases 
from 4% to 24%; but the likelihood that only one (but not both) of them is 
withhold stays roughly the same (27.6% versus 26.7%). 
For ISS, by contrast, the data support the higher proclivity hypothesis. 
If one recommendation is withhold, the likelihood of getting a single other 
withhold increases from 8% to 38%. The likelihood of getting two 
withholds, of course, also increases (from 1.4% to 12.5%), but that increase 
is in line with the increase that would be expected given a higher proclivity 
to get a withhold recommendation. 
For EJ, in turn, the data support both hypotheses. The likelihood of 
getting a single other withhold increases from 12% to 22%, showing 
support for the higher proclivity hypothesis, and the likelihood of getting 
two withholds increases from 5% to 65%, which is more than what one 
would expect if only the higher proclivity hypothesis were correct. 
On the whole, therefore, the data indicate significant differences in the 
manner in which, and the reasons why, recommendations for the same 
individual are correlated. For GL, the correlation is driven predominantly 
by the same factors that, when present, result in across-the-board withhold 
recommendations. For ISS, the correlation is likely due to the fact that 
some individuals are more prone to take (or refrain from taking) actions 
that result in a withhold recommendation. Given this trait, however, 
recommendations are independent. For EJ, it is likely that both of these 
forces are at work for different individuals. For none of the advisors did we 
 
 73. In particular, the spillover hypothesis would predict that, for advisors who issued two 
recommendations, there would be fewer withhold/for recommendations (in that chronological order) 
than for/withhold recommendations. For all advisors, these numbers were virtually identical. 
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find evidence that they consider a director’s conduct on one board in 
issuing a recommendation for a different board. 
To further investigate the reasons why some directors receive across-
the-board withhold recommendations, we compared, for each proxy 
advisor, the characteristics of nominees who received all withhold 
recommendations (the “all withhold” group) and those who received at 
least one withhold recommendation but at least one other for 
recommendation (the “mixed withhold” group). For ISS and PG, the 
former group was too small to make meaningful comparisons. 
For GL, we found that nominees who sat on more than the median 
number of boards, and those who were members of audit committees, were 
much more prevalent in the all withhold group than in the mixed withhold 
group (55% versus 35% for members of many boards, 60% versus 46% for 
audit committee members), but members of compensation committees were 
less prevalent in the all withhold group than in the mixed withhold group 
(38% versus 55%). One plausible explanation is that membership on too 
many boards, and certain conduct on the part of audit committee members 
(or membership on too many audit committees), lead to across-the-board 
withhold recommendations for GL. 
For EJ, we also found that nominees who sat on more than the median 
number of boards were more prevalent in the all withhold group than in the 
mixed withhold group (81% versus 51%). In addition, members of 
compensation committees were somewhat more prevalent in the all 
withhold group (54% versus 46%), but outside linked directors were 
substantially less prevalent in the all withhold group than in the mixed 
withhold group (7% versus 24%). Again, a plausible explanation is that 
membership on too many boards, and possibly certain conduct on the part 
of compensation committee members, lead to across-the-board withhold 
recommendations for EJ. As to why outside linked directors are relatively 
uncommon in the all withhold group, the likely explanation is that the 
factors associated with across-the-board withhold recommendations are 
negatively correlated with being an outside linked director. 
VI.  GROUP-BASED RECOMMENDATIONS AND INTRACOMPANY 
SPILLOVER RECOMMENDATIONS 
We next examined how the recommendations for nominees to the 
board of a single company relate to each other. To do this, we examined, 
for each advisor, those recommendations where the advisor issued 
recommendations (either for or withhold) for at least six nominees to the 
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same board. We further divided these recommendation samples into three 
subsets: recommendation subsamples where the fraction of withhold 
recommendations for nominees to the same board was less than 0.34 (the 
“low-withhold” subsample); those where that fraction was greater than 0.34 
but less than 0.66 (the “medium-withhold” subsample); and those were that 
fraction was greater than 0.66 (the “high-withhold” subsample). High-
withhold situations thus occur when a proxy advisor issues a withhold 
recommendation for a substantial (more than two-thirds) fraction of the 
board. Low-withhold situations occur when a proxy advisor focuses its 
withhold recommendation on one or a small number of directors on a 
specific board. 
Table 9.1 provides, for each proxy advisor, the number of withhold 
recommendations in each subsample. Table 9.1 shows that the percentages 
of withhold recommendations in each subsample (as the percentage of all 
withhold recommendations) are not equally distributed for each proxy 
advisor. Specifically, for ISS and PG, a much greater proportion of all 
withhold recommendations are in the medium- and high-withhold 
subsamples than for GL and EJ. Notably, one would expect that advisors 
that are generally more likely to issue withhold recommendations would 
have a higher proportion of their withhold recommendations in the 
medium- and high- withhold subsamples. However, ISS and PG are 
generally less likely to issue withhold recommendations than GL and EJ. 
To take direct account of the differences in the overall withhold rate, 
we calculated, based on the actual distribution of board sizes in each 
subsample, the expected number of withhold recommendations, in each 
subsample and for each advisor, given the overall rate of withhold 
recommendations for that advisor and assuming that recommendations for 
each nominee are independent. Comparing the expected and actual number 
of withhold recommendations shows that, for each advisor, the number of 
actual withhold recommendations in the medium- and high-withhold 
subsamples is higher than expected, given the assumption that 
recommendations are independent. This suggests that withhold 
recommendations among nominees for the same board by the same advisor 
are positively correlated.  
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TABLE 9.1.  Withhold Subsamples 








ISS Actual Number of  
 W/H Recs. in Subsample 
250 180 126 556 
ISS % of Total W/H Recs. 45% 32% 23% 100% 
ISS Expected Number of 
 W/H Recs. 
543.3 12.6 0.1 556 
     
PG Actual Number of  
 W/H Recs. in Subsample 
43 83 8 134 
PG % of Total W/H Recs. 32% 62% 6% 100% 
PG Expected Number of 
 W/H Recs. 
132.9 1.0 0.0 134 
     
GL Actual Number of  
 W/H Recs. in Subsample 
1061 713 147 1921 
GL % of Total W/H Recs. 55% 37% 8% 100% 
GL Expected Number of 
 W/H Recs. 
1471.3 436.1 13.7 1921 
     
EJ Actual Number of  
 W/H Recs. in Subsample 
834 267 16 1117 
EJ % of Total W/H Recs. 75% 24% 1% 100% 
EJ Expected Number of  
 W/H Recs. 
1014.8 100.6 1.6 1117 
The degree to which the number of withhold recommendations in the 
medium and high groups exceeds the expected number differs substantially 
among advisors. For GL and EJ, the number of actual withhold 
recommendations in the medium and high subsamples combined is, 
respectively, 1.9 and 2.8 times the expected number. By contrast, for ISS 
and PG, the number of actual withhold recommendations in the medium 
and high groups is, respectively, 24.1 and 91.0 times the expected number. 
This indicates that the positive correlation of recommendations among 
nominees to the same board is higher for ISS and PG than for GL and EJ. 
Two factors can generate a positive correlation in recommendations 
among nominees to the board. First, the proxy advisor may issue “group-
based” recommendations. For example, the advisor may issue withhold 
recommendations for the whole compensation committee (or even the 
whole board) if it finds that the CEO is receiving excessive compensation. 
Second, the advisor may issue “spillover” recommendations, where 
attributes of one nominee affect the recommendation of other nominees. 
For example, a proxy advisor may not generally issue withhold 
recommendations for outside linked directors if the total number of such 
nominees to the board of a single company is sufficiently low, but may 
  
690 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82:649 
 
TABLE 9.2.  Attribute Representation in ISS and PG Withhold Subsamples 
Attribute ISS Low ISS Medium ISS High PG Low PG Medium 
CEO 2.7% 15.0% 11.8% 0.0% 1.2% 
New Director 15.0% 8.9% 7.9% 2.3% 3.6% 
AuditMbr 28.7% 13.9% 38.2% 39.4% 47.6% 
Prior Restat 12.4% 7.2% 3.2% 9.3% 3.6% 
Prior SEC 10.4% 10.0% 8.7% 4.7% 14.5% 
CompMbr 50.2% 27.7% 44.6% 81.8% 93.9% 
Top5AbComp 7.5% 17.8% 8.9% 16.3% 30.3% 
Attendance 9.0% 1.2% 0.0% 9.1% 2.4% 
ManyBds 27.6% 5.1% 10.4% 18.2% 6.1% 
Age75 16.0% 12.8% 16.7% 23.3% 16.7% 
NomMbr 57.0% 21.2% 35.5% 48.5% 46.3% 
Empl_Dir 3.1% 31.3% 6.4% 0.0% 0.0% 
OutDirLink 48.0% 28.3% 18.2% 12.1% 7.3% 
BlockDir 1.8% 8.4% 2.7% 0.0% 0.0% 
IP No 0.0% 0.0% 17.8% 0.0% 0.0% 
Bot5AbRet 6.8% 0.0% 4.8% 0.0% 0.0% 
Top5AbRet 6.4% 6.7% 9.5% 7.0% 3.6% 
 
Note: Numbers are the percentages of the withhold recommendations for the particular subsample. For example, 
directors with the IP No attribute account for 17.8% of the ISS withhold recommendations that resulted in the high 
category. 
issue withhold recommendations for all outside linked director nominees if 
too many of them are nominated to the same board. Correlations may be 
higher for those proxy advisors that employ group-based or spillover 
recommendations relatively more frequently. 
To determine what accounts for the high positive correlation among 
nominees in recommendations made by ISS and PG, we compared the 
nominees who received withhold recommendations in the low-withhold 
subsample to those who received withhold recommendations in the 
medium-withhold and high-withhold subsamples. (Given the low number 
of withhold recommendations in the PG high-withhold group, we did not 
include figures for that subsample.) In the absence of group-based and 
spillover recommendations, we would expect no systematic difference in 
these attributes. The data are presented in table 9.2. 
For ISS, we find that CEOs account for a significantly greater 
percentage of the withhold recommendations in the medium-withhold 
group than in the low-withhold group. Similarly, employee directors and 
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block directors are more highly represented in the medium- (and, to a lesser 
extent, in the high-) withhold group than in the low-withhold group. In 
contrast to these insider and quasi-insider directors, members of audit, 
compensation or nominating committees (which consist predominantly of 
outside directors) and outside linked directors are relatively 
underrepresented in the medium-withhold group. This suggests a possible 
spillover effect that we investigate further below. 
In addition, table 9.2 provides evidence that ISS issues group-based 
withhold recommendations (covering all or almost all nominees) when it 
determines that the board has inappropriately ignored a shareholder 
proposal. Such nominees account for 17.8% of the withhold 
recommendations in the high withhold group, but none in the low- and 
medium-withhold groups. Notably, GL, the only other advisor for which 
IP No was statistically significant, does not make it a basis for group-based 
withhold recommendations. Nominees coded as IP No account for 0.9% of 
the withhold recommendations in the low group and, respectively, 1.1% 
and 0.0% of the withhold recommendations in the medium and high 
groups.  
Consistent with our earlier finding that paying abnormally high 
compensation is associated with an increased likelihood of a withhold 
recommendation for compensation committee members (but not for other 
directors), we also find that Top5AbComp accounts for a higher percentage 
of the withhold recommendations in the medium group than in the other 
groups.  
For PG, the most salient result is that withhold recommendations in 
the medium-withhold group consist disproportionally of nominees on 
boards where the CEO receives abnormally high compensation compared 
with the low-withhold group (30.3% of the withhold recommendations in 
the medium group versus 16.3% in the low-withhold group) and almost 
entirely of members of the compensation committee (93.9%, or seventy-
seven of eighty-two nominees that received withhold recommendations, in 
the medium group versus 81.8% in the low-withhold group). Conversely 
(and not reported in table 9.2), only two of seventy-nine compensation 
committee members in the medium-withhold subsample received a for 
recommendation. This evidence indicates that PG issues group-based 
recommendations on compensation committee members for compensation 
issues (but not for any other directors and other issues), holding the entire 
committee responsible for inappropriate compensation practices. 
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We now turn to examining more closely our earlier finding that, as to 
ISS, CEOs, as well as employee directors and block directors, are more 
highly represented in the medium-withhold group than in the low-withhold 
group. This finding is of special interest because ISS is reported to be the 
most influential proxy advisor and because it is the only advisor for which 
being a CEO is associated with an increased likelihood of a withhold 
recommendation (see table 3 above). The data in table 9.2 suggest that this 
association is attributable to group-based or spillover effects, since CEOs 
are substantially underrepresented in the low-withhold subsample.  
We hypothesize that withhold recommendations for CEOs in the 
medium-withhold subsample represent a spillover effect from the presence 
of excessive numbers of “suspect” directors on the board. When ISS 
considers that number to be inappropriately high, it issues withhold 
recommendations for both the suspect directors and the CEO, with the 
result that CEOs are overrepresented in the medium-withhold subsample.74 
For the purpose of our hypothesis, we consider three types of directors 
as potentially suspect: employee directors, outside linked directors, and 
block directors. Note that employee and block directors are themselves 
overrepresented in the medium-withhold subsample. This may be due to a 
spillover effect—that is, ISS may be more likely to issue withhold 
recommendations for these types of suspect directors when their number is 
inappropriately high. By contrast, outside linked directors are more highly 
represented in the low-withhold subsample than in the medium-withhold 
subsample. This suggests that ISS tends to issue withhold 
recommendations for outside linked directors regardless of their number 
(that is, without any spillover effect). Indeed, as shown in table 9.3, outside 
linked directors account for 9.9% of all nominees (who received either a for 
or a withhold recommendation) in the low-withhold subsample; but they 
account for 43% of nominees who received a withhold recommendation in 
the low-withhold subsample. Thus, even in that subsample, being an 
outside linked director is associated with an increased likelihood of an ISS 
withhold recommendation. By contrast, being a CEO or employee director 
is not associated with an increased likelihood of a withhold 
recommendation in the low-withhold subsample. (As shown in table 9.3, 
CEOs and employee directors are less frequently represented among 
nominees who received withhold recommendations than among nominees 
overall in the low-withhold subsample.) 
 
 74. In effect, ISS may be holding the CEO responsible for allowing the issuer to maintain an 
ineffective board or lobbying for the CEO’s replacement in circumstances in which the board is 
unresponsive. 
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TABLE 9.3.  Types of Directors in ISS Withhold Subsamples 
Attribute Low Subsample: 
All Recs. 
Low Subsample: 




W/H Recs. Only 
All Nominees 8434 250 361 180 





































Note: Percentages of all nominees are in parentheses. 
Even if ISS issues withhold recommendations for outside linked 
directors regardless of their number, the number of outside linked directors 
may affect the likelihood that other types of directors, specifically CEOs, 
receive a withhold recommendation. Note, in this respect, that outside 
linked directors account for a higher proportion of all nominees for 
medium-withhold boards than they do for all nominees for low-withhold 
boards. This indicates that the number of outside linked directors on a 
board may be related to the percentage of nominees who received withhold 
recommendations. 
To test for the presence of spillover effects, we repeat our base 
regression with several additions. First, we add dummy variables for the 
presence of various types of potentially suspect directors as follows: 
Many_Empl_Dir, taking the value of 1 if the number of employee director 
nominees is two or more and 0 otherwise; Many_OutDirLink, taking the 
value of 1 if the number of outside linked director nominees is two or more 
and 0 otherwise; and Many_BlockDir, taking the value of 1 if the number 
of block director nominees is one or more and 0 otherwise. We then 
interact each of these dummy variables with CEO and further interact 
Many_Empl_Dir with Empl_Dir, Many_OutDirLink with OutDirLink, and 
Many_BlockDir with BlockDir (the latter variable being collinear with 
BlockDir). The results of this regression are presented in table 10. (For 
simplicity, we report only the results for the added variables as well as for 
CEO, Empl_Dir, and OutDirLink.) 
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TABLE 10.  Suspect Directors 
Attribute VoteISS VotePG VoteGL VoteEJ 
CEO 0.242 -0.856* -1.183*** -0.607** 
 (1.18) (-1.88) (-5.87) (-2.37) 
     
Empl_Dir 1.172*** 0.750 0.882*** -0.101 
 (4.26) (0.71) (5.10) (-0.31) 
     
Many_Empl_Dir 0.0573 0.473 0.223* -0.139 
 (0.23) (0.64) (1.82) (-0.86) 
     








     
Many_Empl_Dir × CEO 1.212*** ... -1.383* 0.819 
 (3.20)  (-1.83) (1.44) 
     
OutDirLink 1.895*** 0.654 1.401*** 1.663*** 
 (10.64) (1.43) (12.69) (11.50) 
     
Many_OutDirLink 0.139 0.705 0.023 0.122 
 (0.56) (1.57) (0.24) (0.91) 
     










     
Many_OutDirLink × CEO 0.606** 0.533 0.312 0.213 
 (2.11) (0.37) (0.73) (0.47) 
     
BlockDir 0.180 2.622*** 0.439 0.830** 
 (0.63) (3.21) (1.58) (2.34) 
     
Many_BlockDir 0.593** -1.402 -0.003 0.424* 
 (1.96) (-1.48) (-0.02) (1.89) 
     
Many_BlockDir × CEO 1.066*** 3.045*** 1.125** 1.200** 
 (3.94) (3.15) (2.25) (2.49) 
     
Year06 -0.134 0.189 0.148** -0.215*** 
 (-1.02) (0.82) (2.39) (-2.94) 
     
Constant -3.876*** -5.883*** -2.083*** -4.110*** 
 (-5.93) (-3.67) (-6.42) (-8.58) 
N 11,833 4388 12,973 11,809 
pseudo R2 0.163 0.212 0.108 0.211 
 
Note: t-statistics are in parentheses. All models use the base model in table 3 with the addition of interaction terms. We 
report only the coefficients for the additional interaction terms and associated variables. Where data are unavailable, 
ellipsis dots are inserted. 
 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
The results for ISS indicate a substantial spillover effect of all three 
classifications of potentially suspect directors onto CEO. The presence of 
any type of suspect director nominee significantly increases the likelihood 
of an ISS withhold recommendation for the CEO. (In F-tests, 
Many_Empl_Dir + Many_Empl_Dir × CEO, Many_OutDirLink + 
Many_OutDirLink × CEO, and Many_BlockDir + Many_BlockDir × CEO 
are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively; CEO + 
Empl_Dir + Many_Empl_Dir × CEO, CEO + Many_OutDirLink + 
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Many_OutDirLink × CEO, and CEO + Many_BlockDir + Many_BlockDir 
× CEO are each significant at the 1% level.) In the absence of these 
spillover factors, CEOs do not have an increased likelihood of receiving a 
withhold recommendation (the CEO variable on its own is insignificant). 
Thus, the finding in our base regression that CEOs are significantly more 
likely to receive an ISS withhold recommendation is entirely explained by 
spillover effects. Our results are robust for various variations, such as 
excluding nominees from companies with classified boards, adding 
additional interaction variables, and using different variables to signify an 
excessive number of suspect directors. We also find evidence that the 
likelihood of a withhold recommendation for employee directors increases 
if there are at least two employee directors nominated to the board (in F-
tests, Many_Empl_Dir + Many_Empl_Dir × Empl_Dir is significant at the 
5% level).  
We run similar regressions for the other proxy advisors. We find no 
evidence of any spillover effects for PG. For GL, we find weak evidence 
that the likelihood of a withhold recommendation for any nominee (other 
than the CEO) increases if there are at least two employee directors 
nominated to the board (Many_Empl_Dir is significant, but only at the 10% 
level). Furthermore, we find that, while CEOs are generally less likely to 
receive a withhold recommendation from GL, they are no less likely to 
receive a withhold recommendation if at least one block director is 
nominated to the board (CEO + Many_BlockDir + Many_BlockDir × CEO 
is insignificant). For EJ, we find that employee directors are significantly 
more likely to receive a withhold recommendation if and only if at least 
two such directors are nominated (Empl_Dir is insignificant, while 
Empl_Dir + Many_Empl_Dir + Many_Empl_Dir × Empl_Dir is 
significant at the 5% level); that outside linked directors are more likely (at 
the 5% level) to receive a withhold recommendation if at least two such 
directors are nominated; and that CEOs, who are ordinarily less likely to 
receive a withhold recommendation, are more likely (at the 10% level) to 
do so if at least one block director is nominated to the board. 
The results of these analyses suggest that ISS (and to a lesser degree 
GL and EJ) considers the overall composition of the board as an important 
factor in issuing recommendations on specific directors. Combining this 
finding with the results of the previous sections indicates that proxy 
advisors may focus their evaluation of a particular nominee primarily 
within the context of a specific company. 
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VII.  IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Our analysis largely supports the conclusion that proxy advisors 
provide a valuable service to their investor clients. Significantly, advisor 
recommendations—at least with respect to uncontested director elections—
appear to be based on the factors that should matter to investors: good 
governance, director attention, and performance. We find compelling 
evidence that withhold recommendations are made in response to 
identifiable issuer- and director-specific problems, including, among 
others, financial restatements, SEC investigations, excessive executive 
compensation, failure to attend board meetings, lack of independence, and 
failure to implement precatory proposals adopted by shareholders. By 
contrast, antitakeover devices, which are often the subject of precatory 
shareholder resolutions, appear to have no impact on recommendations in 
director elections. 
We find mixed evidence (depending on the advisor and the issue) that 
advisors use withhold recommendations to target those board members 
who bear responsibility for the issuer-specific problems triggering the 
recommendations. Of particular interest may be our findings that only one 
proxy advisor (ISS) is more likely to issue a withhold recommendation for 
the CEO if the company’s stock price persistently underperforms the 
market averages and that no advisor is less likely to issue a withhold 
recommendation for the CEO if the company’s stock price consistently 
outperforms the market averages. 
Among our most significant findings about proxy advisor 
recommendations is the heterogeneity among proxy advisors. Proxy 
advisors differ significantly from each other in their propensity to issue 
withhold recommendations, in the factors on which they base their 
recommendations, in the weight accorded to those factors, in their 
propensity to issue a greater number of withhold recommendations for 
persons nominated for multiple board seats, in their proclivity to issue 
group-based and spillover recommendations, and in their reasons for doing 
so. 
This heterogeneity raises the initial issue of whether and to what 
extent the institutional investors who hire these proxy advisors are aware of 
the factors each advisor uses in making its recommendations. To the extent 
that investors are aware of those factors or will become so (as a result of 
this or similar studies), heterogeneity is desirable as it enables investors to 
subscribe to and follow the recommendations of those advisors that 
conform to the investor’s assessment of value-maximizing corporate 
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governance. For example, an investor who believes that proper audit and 
disclosure is the most important board function may be best served by 
following the recommendations of GL, while an investor concerned with 
executive compensation may want to give serious weight to 
recommendations by PG. Moreover, public examination of the factors that 
result in withhold recommendations increases transparency and makes 
proxy advisors (and those institutional investors that follow their 
recommendations) more accountable to members of the public who hold 
shares through institutional investors and to corporate governance 
policymakers. 
To the extent that investors are not aware of these factors, however, 
the fact that the different advisors employ substantially different 
methodologies in making recommendations suggests that investors may not 
accurately perceive the information content associated with a withhold 
recommendation. This could lead investors to follow blindly the 
recommendation of a proxy advisor, even when that recommendation is 
based on factors that the investors would not consider relevant. In that case, 
proxy advisors would not be serving the goal of facilitating an informed 
shareholder vote. The result would be to reduce the effectiveness of the 
shareholder franchise because shareholders would not be voting their true 
preferences. In such a scenario, proposals to expand the shareholder vote 
should be taken up with caution. Likewise, the criticism of proxy 
advisors—as powerful governance actors that lack proper incentives and 
accountability as to the content of their recommendations and have the 
ability to base these recommendations on their whim, to follow their own 
ideological agenda, or perhaps even to pursue their own conflicting 
business interests—would warrant serious attention. 
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APPENDIX.  Variable Definitions 
 
Variable  Definition 
Age75  Indicator variable equal to 1 if the director is seventy-five years 
old or older and 0 otherwise. 
   
Attendance  Indicator variable equal to 1 if the director attended less than 75 
percent of the meetings (as tracked by the IRRC for the year 
prior to the annual meeting date) and 0 otherwise. 
   
AuditMbr  Indicator variable equal to 1 if the director is a member of the 
audit committee and 0 otherwise. 
   
BlockDir  Indicator variable equal to 1 if the director owns more than 20 
percent of the outstanding shares of the company in question and 
0 otherwise. 
   
Bot5AbRet  Indicator variable equal to 1 if the abnormal return for the three-
year period prior to the annual meeting date for the company in 
question is in the bottom 5 percent of the sample and 0 
otherwise. The abnormal return is defined as the difference 
between the raw three-year holding period return for the 
company in question and the three-year holding period return for 
the CRSP value-weighted market index. 
   
CEO  Indicator variable equal to 1 if the director is the CEO of the 
company in question and 0 otherwise. 
   
Chairman Only 
 
 Indicator variable equal to 1 if the director is the chairman of the 
board of the company in question (but not an employee) and 0 
otherwise. 
   
ClassBd  Indicator variable equal to 1 if the director sits on a classified 
board for the company in question (as measured by the IRRC for 
the year prior to the annual meeting date) and 0 otherwise. 
   
CompMbr  Indicator variable equal to 1 if the director is a member of the 
compensation committee and 0 otherwise. 
   
CumVote  Indicator variable equal to 1 if the company in question uses 
cumulative voting to elect directors (as measured by the IRRC 
for the year prior to the annual meeting date) and 0 otherwise. 
   
Empl_Dir  Indicator variable equal to 1 if the director is an employee of the 
company in question (but not the CEO) and 0 otherwise. 
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GP  Indicator variable equal to 1 if the company in question uses 
golden parachute agreements (as measured by the IRRC for the 
year prior to the annual meeting date) and 0 otherwise. 
   
Interlock  Indicator variable equal to 1 if the director met the IRRC criteria 
for an interlocking director in the year prior to the annual 
meeting date and 0 otherwise. The IRRC defines an interlocking 
directorship as follows: a directorship “whereby a director and 
executive of the company ABC sits on a board of another 
company XYZ and a director and executive of company XYZ 
sits on the board of company ABC that has an executive and 
director who also sit[s] on the original company’s board.” 
Definitions for RiskMetrics’ Directors Dataset, 
http://wrds.wharton.upenn.edu/ds/ riskmetrics/dir_doc.shtml (last 
visited Apr. 20, 2009). 
   
IP No  Indicator variable equal to 1 if the company in question faced a 
proxy issue proposal that received a majority for vote and failed 
to implement the recommendations of the proxy issue proposal 
within the following year and 0 otherwise. 
   
ManyBds  Indicator variable equal to 1 if the director is a member of at least 
three other “major” company boards (as followed by the IRRC 
for the year prior to the annual meeting date) and 0 otherwise. 
   
New Director  Indicator variable equal to 1 if the director has been on the board 
for less than two years. 
   
NomMbr  Indicator variable equal to 1 if the director is a member of the 
nominating committee and 0 otherwise. 
   
OutDirLink  Indicator variable equal to 1 if the director is an outside director 
of the company in question with affiliated links with the 
company and 0 otherwise. The IRRC treats as a linked director: 
someone “who is a former employee; is an employee of or is a 
service provider, supplier, customer; is a recipient of charitable 
funds; is considered an interlocking or designated director; or is a 
family member of a director or executive.” Definitions for 
RiskMetrics’ Directors Dataset, http://wrds.wharton.upenn.edu/ 
ds/riskmetrics/dir_doc.shtml (last visited Apr. 20, 2009). 
   
PPill   Indicator variable equal to 1 if a poison pill exists for the 
company in question (as measured by the IRRC for the year prior 
to the annual meeting date) and 0 otherwise. 
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Prior Restat  Indicator variable equal to 1 if news relating to a financial 
restatement was first made public within two years prior to the 
meeting date (either in an SEC filing or through a public press 
release) and 0 otherwise. 
   
Prior SEC 
  
 Indicator variable equal to 1 if news relating to an SEC 
investigation or enforcement action was first made public within 
two years prior to the meeting date (either in an SEC filing or 
through a public press release) and 0 otherwise. 
   
Sdret  Standard deviation of returns for the company in question for the 
one-year period prior to the annual meeting date. 
   
Top5AbComp  Indicator variable equal to 1 if the total excess compensation for 
the CEO for the company in question is in the top 5 percent of 
the sample and 0 otherwise. We define Total Excess CEO 
Compensation as the difference between the Total CEO 
Compensation for the year prior to the meeting date (as provided 
by the Compustat Executive Compensation database) minus the 
Expected Total CEO Compensation. We calculate the Expected 
Total CEO Compensation by first estimating an OLS model as 
follows (following a model suggested to us by Martijn Cremers): 
ln(Total CEO Compensation) = α + β1ln(market_cap)     
+ β2Three_Year_Abnormal_Holding_Period_Return 
+ β3Three_Year_Standard Dev. of Returns                
+ β4Year_2006 + Industry Effects + ε 
We then use the predicted Total CEO Compensation based on 
this model as the Expected Total CEO Compensation. Industry 
effects were based on two-digit SIC codes. 
Abnormal_Holding_Period_Return is defined as the difference 
between the holding period return and the value-weighted CRSP 
market index for the same period. 
   
Top5AbRet  Indicator variable equal to 1 if the abnormal return for the three-
year period prior to the annual meeting date for the company in 
question is in the top 5 percent of the sample and 0 otherwise. 
The abnormal return is defined as the difference between the raw 
three-year holding period return for the company in question and 
the three-year holding period return for the CRSP value-weighted 
market index. 
   
VoteEJ  Indicator variable equal to 1 if EJ recommends a Withhold vote 
for the director in question and 0 otherwise. 
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VoteGL  Indicator variable equal to 1 if GL recommends a Withhold vote 
for the director in question and 0 otherwise. 
   
VoteISS  Indicator variable equal to 1 if ISS recommends a Withhold vote 
for the director in question and 0 otherwise. 
   
VotePG  Indicator variable equal to 1 if PG recommends a Withhold vote 
for the director in question and 0 otherwise. 
   
Year06  Indicator variable equal to 1 if the director recommendation is for 
2006 and 0 otherwise (for 2005).  
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